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“Would-Be Farmer John and the Welfare State: A Response to Blincoe”

Abstract: Adam Blincoe (2018) aims  to show that libertarianism, at least in Robert Nozick’s version, is faced with a dilemma: “Either (a) Nozick must admit that taxation for the purpose of guaranteeing a compensatory level of welfare (and not merely for protection from harm) is legitimate or (b) he must admit that his entitlement theory cannot satisfy the Lockean proviso.” I discuss Blincoe’s thought experiment involving “Farmer John,” and take issue with his underlying arguments on a number of grounds. I discuss in turn some problems relating to Nozick’s views on the Lockean proviso, the question of how to define an appropriate welfare benchmark for establishing redistributive obligations, and some issues of those obligations.

Keywords: Robert Nozick, minimal state, Lockean proviso, wealth redistribution, entitlement theory

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April 17, 2018, By Jan Narveson Filed Under: Libertarian Papers, Volume 10 (2018)

“Resolving the Debate on Libertarianism and Abortion”

Abstract: I take issue with the view that libertarian theory does not imply any particular stand on abortion. Liberty is the absence of interference with people’s wills—interests, wishes, and desires. Only entities that have such are eligible for the direct rights of libertarian theory. Foetuses do not; and if aborted, there is then no future person whose rights are violated. Hence the “liberal” view of abortion: women (especially) may decide whether to bear the children they have conceived. Birth is a good dividing line between the freedom to abort and the point at which society is permitted to take an interest. Once born, children detach from their mothers; no invasion of their bodies is necessary to separate them. Yet some ways of bringing them up can have a negative impact on society. There is a thus legitimate interest in protecting ourselves from the results of truly bad parenting.

Keywords: Abortion, natural rights, newborn rights, child rights, parenting

Download Paper: “Resolving the Debate on Libertarianism and Abortion”

September 23, 2016, By Jan Narveson Filed Under: Libertarian Papers, Volume 8 (2016)

Liberty, Property, and Welfare Rights: Brettschneider’s Argument

Abstract: Brettschneider argues that the granting of property rights to all entails a right of exclusion by acquirer/owners against all others, that this exclusionary right entails a loss on their part, and that to make up for this, property owners owe any nonowners welfare rights. Against this, I argue that exclusion is not in fact a cost. Everyone is to have liberty rights, which are negative: what people are excluded from is the liberty to attack and despoil others. Everyone, whether an owner of external property or not, benefits from this and thus rationally exchanges that liberty in exchange for a like abandonment of it by others. The proper social contract trade is thus liberty for liberty—not liberty for owners and positive welfare rights for nonowners (though the latter in fact benefit greatly from the property rights of owners).

Download Paper: Liberty, Property, and Welfare Rights: Brettschneider’s Argument

July 31, 2013, By Jan Narveson Filed Under: Libertarian Papers, Volume 5 (2013)

22. “Discussion: Must We Choose between Chandran Kukathas’s ‘Two Constructions of Libertarianism’?”

Abstract: Kukathas, in “Two Constructions of Libertarianism,” concludes that “the choice confronting libertarians is an invidious one. … The Federation of Liberty can, in principle, turn out to contain no communities of that federation which actually value or respect liberty; and even slavery might have a lawful place within it. The Union of Liberty, on the other hand, can, in principle turn out to be society ruled by a strong authority with little respect for dissenting moral traditions, including some self-styled libertarian moral traditions.” However, no such choice needs to be made. The one libertarian principle calls upon us to permit all voluntary association. It allows intervention to correct involuntary association, except in the case of relations of parents and children, the latter being not yet exactly persons. But the criterion of voluntariness is difficult, since people frequently submit themselves to authorities, even to ones who are authorized by those persons to use force against them. And it does not require us to intervene to correct injustices generally.

It is not clear what a “libertarian community” would be, beyond one in which relations among individuals and groups are fundamentally voluntary. But there is no difference between (1) allowing and (2) forbidding the disallowing of various practices, and that is the distinction which in essence the Federation versus the Union is defined in terms of. And the question whether to attempt to realize the libertarian principle better by erecting a single government with the kind of authority governments by definition have, versus making do with a fully anarchic society, is, I think, not settled to this day. Fortunately, as I have argued, the choice is not required by the alternatives Professor Kukathas’s interesting essay poses for us. In short: the libertarian principle remains univocal: no aggression against those not themselves guilty of any aggression. And therefore, no aggression against those with whom we disagree, including about the legitimacy of the libertarian principle. But, certainly, we may use force against those who compel others to go along. The touchstone remains the liberty of the individual.

Download Paper: “Discussion: Must We Choose between Chandran Kukathas’s ‘Two Constructions of Libertarianism’?”

April 27, 2009, By Jan Narveson Filed Under: Libertarian Papers, Volume 1 (2009)

1. “Present Payments, Past Wrongs: Correcting Loose Talk about Nozick and Rectification”

Abstract: It is widely thought that Robert Nozick’s views on rectification of past injustices  are of critical importance to his theory of distributive justice, even perhaps justifying wholesale redistributive taxes in the present because of the undoubted injustices that have pervaded much past history. This essay undertakes to correct this impression—not mostly by disagreeing with Nozick’s claims, but nevertheless proceeding on basic libertarian theory. Of enormous importance is the role of putative innocents, who are defrauded by miscreants carefully covering their tracks so that these recipients have no reason to think they are buying stolen property. But of equal importance is simply that the duty to rectify past injustices is not comparable to the original duty to respect property rights in the first place.

Download Paper: “Present Payments, Past Wrongs: Correcting Loose Talk about Nozick and Rectification”

January 18, 2009, By Jan Narveson Filed Under: Libertarian Papers, Volume 1 (2009)

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  • David Gordon’s JLS EditorialMay 29, 2022
  • Volume 9 of Libertarian Papers is Now Available in Print |August 10, 2018
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