
A STRATEGIC DOCTRINE OF DISPROPORTIONATE FORCE FOR DECENTRALIZED ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

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Newhard (2017) recommends that anarcho-capitalist societies acquire nuclear weapons and adopt aggressive territorial-defense postures. It argues that the defense of anarchist territory will require escalation, preemption, and offensive operations targeting hostile states. It thus rejects the doctrine of dogmatic nonaggression that might arise out of a desire to extend the nonaggression principle (NAP) to enemies and others outside the private defense network. Below, I substantiate the necessity of ruthlessness in the defense of anarchist territory. In doing so, I describe a strategic doctrine of disproportionate force, modeled after Israeli doctrine,¹ that I recommend private defense agencies adopt, given the likely decentralized and asymmetric character of their armed forces.

An anarchist society will face numerous disadvantages. It is likely to be small in size and population. A small territory means a lack of strategic depth. A small population means fewer soldiers and less output to allocate to defense, holding output per capita constant. Perhaps the society will see significant capital accumulation, enhancing productivity and providing

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¹ In particular, I refer to Israel's doctrine concerning hostile state actors such as Syria, Iran, Egypt (preceding the 1979 peace treaty), and Jordan (preceding the 1994 peace treaty).

sufficient funds to cover the large fixed costs of modern defense. Yet it is not certain that corporations will invest in stateless societies. The societies' survival will require that corporations do invest: the societies being relatively small, both the workforce and fighting force must be capital intensive. However, the most efficient substitute for soldiers and the most effective deterrent available to small nations is probably nuclear weapons. Additionally, an anarchist society may have to research and develop its own weapons, as Western defense contractors in particular may embargo them.² Private defense agencies or their contractors must allocate costly weapons research to where they can maximize deterrence, and this likely means focusing on the development of nuclear weapons and appropriate delivery vehicles. Lastly, coordination costs may rise under the private provision of defense, especially if multiple agencies defend the same territory.³ The decentralized and asymmetric nature of stateless warfare will present challenges to be overcome.

² The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 gives the president of the United States the authority to control the import and export of weapons and defense services. Of particular concern are preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, minimizing the risk of outbreak or escalation of war, and reducing international terrorism. The act also prohibits the sale of certain sensitive weapon technologies. Foreign military sales (FMS) and export controls are governed by subpart 225 of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The Department of State approves individual countries on a case-by-case basis, and defense contractors must obtain a license from the department for direct commercial sales (DCS). Both FMS and DCS are subject to similar restrictions and to congressional notification and review. Along with the AECA, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations regime restricts the export of military technology. It seems unlikely that an anarchist society would satisfy the State Department's alleged concerns pertaining to proliferation, escalation, and terrorism. The United States also exerts pressure on allies not to sell arms to its adversaries, as with the canceled Falcon deal between Israel and China in 2000. In any case, the anarchists might be able to import weapons from China or Russia if not the NATO countries.

³ My view is that the chain of command governing a single military increases efficiency and that splitting up the armed forces into several autonomous units each with its own high commander necessarily increases the cost of coordinating an operation relative to a combined force of the same size under one commander. As mentioned below, Napoleon apparently believed that alliances made for weaker opponents for this reason. In a working paper, I argue that defense is a natural monopoly and that private defense agencies are likely to merge and acquire each other for the sake of reducing costs.

In some important ways, the anarchist society I envision resembles modern Israel. Accordingly, Israel's approach to national defense, especially from the time of its establishment in 1948 through the 1980s, proves instructive for anarchists.⁴ It is relatively small in size and population and lacking in natural resources but boasts a technologically advanced and capital-intensive economy and had gross national output of \$320 billion in 2016. These features have molded the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) into a small but superlative military that has survived surprise attacks by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan while conquering new territory. Israel has built a powerful air force; maintains an effective defense shield against artillery shells, mortars, rockets, missiles, and planes; and is widely believed to wield a nuclear arsenal produced from its own nuclear reactor and nuclear-reprocessing plant. Israel's ability to survive in the face of large, hostile neighbors despite its disadvantages makes it an excellent template for anarchist defense.

One key difference between an anarchist society and Israel is the latter's superpower backing. It is doubtful that the anarchists will have any state benefactors, large or small.⁵ This is not entirely negative: Israeli leaders have "generally felt that the combined and complementary pressure of the superpowers snatched away from the IDF an imminent clear-cut victory in August 1970 and again in October 1973" (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 8–9). Although US taxpayers provide Israel with \$3.8 billion annually in military aid, amounting to a quarter of its defense budget (Gazit, 2011, 1), this pressures Israel to accede to the demands of the US government, which has regional interests of its own. This relationship restricts Israel's ability to export arms to some countries, cultivates "a culture of dependence," and limits Israel's ability to cooperate with America's rivals such as China (Gazit, 2011). Furthermore, 75 percent of the military grants must be spent on American arms, even at the cost of higher prices and inferior quality while undermining the Israeli defense industry in the process (*ibid.*, 5).

⁴ This paper will focus on Israeli strategy from its founding through the 1980s, when the country's primary threats consisted of large neighboring states. Since then, "extreme, violent, and well-armed substate actors have replaced neighboring state armies as Israel's main military threat" (Herzog, 2015). Israel's armed conflicts remain asymmetric, but the power distribution is now in its favor as it combats militant groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah.

⁵ There are possible scenarios in which a state would support an anarchist society, such as if Russia decided to back anarchists in the United States to destabilize the government or region. Murphy (2017, 226) entertains the same possibility: "One coalition of global powers might 'adopt and protect' the anarchist island from rival powers, the way the Soviet Union was allied with Cuba during the Cold War."

Consequently, “superpower intervention is regarded, overall, as an obstruction and diminution of Israeli advantages. In particular, it is seen to provide the Arabs an opportunity to wage wars of limited liability” (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 9).⁶ Other important differences between the anarchist society and Israel include the latter’s military conscription, its central bank, and the power to tax.

Lastly, the stated goals of Israeli defense planners⁷ are in general terms also the anarchists’ goals. Anarchists seek to preserve their culture of private property and nonaggression and to attract capital and technology to enjoy high living standards. Fighting even victorious wars undermines these goals, so the highest priority must be deterrence. The most effective means of deterrence is to maintain a military force capable of defeating the enemy, preferably with a minimal loss of anarchist life, property, and output. Since aggressors are rational agents who weigh the costs and benefits of invasion, anarchists must advertise a willingness to impose great costs on them. This sometimes requires subordinating considerations of the NAP to those of military expediency.⁸ If deterrence is successful, the NAP will remain in force because the threat of retaliation will discourage potential invaders from provoking the anarchists from the start; as in Israel, the objective is “deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post” (Beres, 2016). Below, I argue that anarchists must reject the martyrdom of dogmatic nonaggression in foreign affairs and instead adopt a strategic doctrine of disproportionate force, modeled after Israeli doctrine. My guiding principle is that of Cicero two thousand years ago: “Let the safety of the people be the highest law.”

⁶ With a defense budget of \$18.6 billion in 2015, Israel finds that US military aid constitutes a significant and important resource. Although American aid has allowed Israel to increase its military budget, it is also not thought to be reliable in the long run and is believed to foster dependence (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 6). On a related note, the Israeli defense budget does show that the anarchists will not have to come anywhere near the \$600 billion the United States spent on war and defense in fiscal year 2015 in order to effectively defend themselves.

⁷ These are defined in Eizenkot (2016) as:

- 1) Safeguarding its existence and defending its territory and its residents.
- 2) Preserving its values and its character.
- 3) Securing its social and economic power.
- 4) Strengthening its international status and maintaining peace.

⁸ Newhard (2017, 63) lists several such scenarios including preventive strikes, some preemptive attacks, the deliberate bombing of infrastructure and private property, and any attack involving collateral damage.

1. Constraints

The anarchist society will face certain disadvantages in its struggle for survival. The first of these pertains to population size. At present, it seems that any arising anarchist society would have few residents. Perhaps as few as one hundred people worldwide would abandon their homes, careers, and social networks to establish an anarcho-capitalist society today. Certainly a figure as high as one million seems excessively optimistic, yet this may be the minimum threshold to establish even a modest conventional defense apparatus, let alone the standing army and nuclear force of Newhard (2017).⁹

If the population is small, the territory will also be small. Lacking strategic depth, maneuverability will suffer. Invaders will have easier access to military assets and to residential and business investments. Defending a smaller area may also bring certain tactical advantages, discussed below. However, the territory defended must be contiguous, an outer buffer zone will be essential, and the anarchists must maintain air superiority. Geography will also play an important role in defense, even with advanced weapons.¹⁰ Although it is difficult to speculate on the physical features of a country not yet in existence, we can posit some ideal features of anarchist territory: A mountain perimeter will provide a natural defense barrier. Fertile land, plentiful water, and a climate conducive to growing crops will be ideal.¹¹ Natural resources such as lumber, coal, oil, and even rare earth elements may be invaluable. Access to land and sea trading routes will allow the anarchists to exploit their comparative advantages. Yet, depending on location, we must also consider that the anarchist society may be cut off from trade altogether.

⁹ Even assuming a sustained disintegration of the Westphalian system in the coming centuries, some sort of exogenous shock may be necessary to achieve the critical mass that allows a market-anarchist society to assume its rightful place among the powers of the earth.

¹⁰ Journalist Ze'ev Schiff argues, "Speed and precision of modern weaponry actually increase the importance of topography and geography in the modern battlefield" (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 28).

¹¹ To the extent that trade is impeded by state meddling or by geography, the anarchist society will have to become self-sufficient. However, if trade is unimpeded, land and climate become less important to survival. Much of Israel's land is not ideal for farming, but citrus fruits are among its major exports. Effective water management has allowed Israeli farmers to increase output in recent years. Grains, fruits, nuts, and beef are among the country's major imports (US Department of Commerce, 2017).

Although an island may be a tempting location since there are some uninhabited and unclaimed ones, it may be difficult to defend.¹² This will not matter if no state is interested in the island, but that is most likely to be the case only if the island's location or natural resources are of little strategic or economic value. If the island is uninhabited, it is likely a poor source of food, fresh water, and other necessities of life, not to mention oil, coal, iron, cotton, lumber, corn, rice, wheat, beef, or other major commodities. If the island is isolated, trade will be extremely costly, diminishing opportunities for specialization and reducing living standards. Regrettably, the same lands anarchists find appealing are likely to be of value to states. If the anarchists find an acceptable island, even a modest state navy may quietly cut it off from trade and communication, strangling it. An island may put the anarchists at greater threat of a hopeless siege unless they invest in a powerful navy of their own.¹³

Market anarchists expect that throwing off the state will result in unprecedented capital investment, technological advancement, and growth in output per capita. This productivity will attract even more residents, including statisticians who are only attracted to higher wages (if permitted entry).¹⁴ However, it is possible that capital accumulation will be low, resulting in a largely agrarian society of farmers and homesteaders and low output per capita. The economic theory of regulation holds that many corporations do not prefer a free market, in which competition drives long-run profits down to zero. Corporations and the state thus enter into a symbiotic relationship by which the state imposes regulations, taxes, and monopoly privileges via patents, copyrights, and trademarks to diminish competition, allowing

¹² Murphy (2017) assumes an island throughout his analysis of libertarian defense.

¹³ In my estimation, sieges will be more manageable for the anarchists on land than at sea. It seems that the larger the territory, the more difficult it becomes for the imperialist power to successfully cut off the defender from the outside world, but this is true only on land; islands seem easier to isolate with only a few boats and planes, as during the Cuban missile crisis. In contrast, even in Operation Rolling Thunder the United States was never able to prevent soldiers and supplies from traveling along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to supply the Viet Cong, for instance.

¹⁴ A free and happy population and a modern, industrialized economy will provide advantages for defense, as in Israel, which seeks "to generate a more technically competent, and more highly motivated force than her adversaries. Differences in internal cohesion have also meant that all of Israel's power is 'usable' in war, whereas the Arabs have had to tie down forces for defense of the internal regime" (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 10).

corporations to generate profits, in turn giving the state something to tax.¹⁵ Furthermore, to attract foreign direct investment, capitalists must believe that the anarchists are capable of enforcing property rights and that their society carries low country risk and political risk. Defense agencies must provide capitalists with assurances that their capital will be safe from an invasion.¹⁶ Yet to build formidable defenses sufficient to attract business capital investment, anarchists will require significant military capital. This feedback loop could impair the ability of a free society to achieve a critical mass. Since a lack of capital would rule out building a modern military, I assume below that the anarchists will be able to attract capital investment.

Lastly, private defense agencies will bear coordination costs not experienced by their statist rivals. If defense is decentralized—provided by multiple agencies—this will increase the cost of defense, rendering it slower and less decisive. As Ben-Horin and Posen (1981, 10) report, “Coalitions tend to have coordination problems in planning and running joint military operations. They are plagued by disputes about risks, costs, and the distribution of plunder.” This is why Napoleon once stated that he preferred to wage war against alliances. Coordination among various private defense agencies may slow down defense and increase its costs relative to vertically integrated state armies. Fortunately, coordination costs will be offset to some extent by the greater efficiency that comes with private ownership of military assets and the profit motive. Modern defense may even be a natural monopoly, given the large fixed costs it entails, in which case the coordination costs would be further reduced if private defense companies merged. Given the superior efficiency of defense provision by private actors, the assumption of coordination costs will be relaxed in the remainder of the paper. In the next section, I will briefly discuss asymmetric warfare in light of the above constraints.

2. Asymmetric Warfare

Asymmetric warfare usually refers to irregular conflicts¹⁷ between state and nonstate actors—the latter typically consisting of guerilla forces

¹⁵ For more on the theory of regulation, see Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), Posner (1974), and Becker (1983).

¹⁶ Even if corporations and their cash flows are fully insurable, insurance costs will escalate if defense is unreliable.

¹⁷ “Irregular Warfare: A violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other

employing terrorism, sabotage, subversion, and insurgency (Jones, 2012, 1–2)—but, in its most general sense, concerns conflicts in which there is a disproportionate distribution of power.¹⁸ Given that the anarchist economy is likely to be relatively small, its military apparatus will also be modest. Anarchists can compensate for the lack of soldiers with investments in capital, but as Israel has discovered, even the most technologically advanced weapons in the world are not a perfect substitute for boots on the ground (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 5–6). Additionally, if technology and capital are lacking in the economy, it is difficult to provide cutting-edge defense, leaving anarchists reliant on guerilla forces and tactics (see Rothbard, 1999; Stromberg, 2003). The analysis of anarchist wars with states must therefore consider the likely-asymmetric nature of the conflict. Below, I assume that the anarchists are able to build a proper military rather than rely on guerillas and small arms alone. Accordingly, we may look to Israel as a model for national survival.

Israel has developed a unique defense strategy in light of its geography, relatively small population, and relatively meager natural resources. It lacks strategic depth,¹⁹ given its shape and size, and “Israel’s population, industry, and military infrastructure are heavily concentrated and within easy reach from the borders” (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 5). Given these realities, military planners believe that Israel “must create artificial strategic depth by means of fortifications in depth... [and] all wars must be transferred to enemy territory as quickly as possible,” requiring offensive forces and an “inclination to preempt” (*ibid.*, 5). To survive a surprise attack, Israel maintains an advanced early-warning system and a large standing army (*ibid.*, 6). Its small size also provides the advantage of interior lines, allowing it to concentrate forces on one front or shift between fronts rapidly (*ibid.*, 10).²⁰

capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will” (Department of the Army, 2008, Glossary-11).

¹⁸ “Asymmetric warfare is generally understood to be a conflict in which the strengths and sizes of the opponents do not mirror each other. The side with the conventional disadvantage is probably incapable of winning through direct, conventional warfare. It must seek victory through other methods that exploit weaknesses in the superior conventional power’s capacity to prevail” (Department of the Army, 2008, J-3).

¹⁹ “A hostile fighter could fly across all of Israel (40 nautical miles wide from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea) within four minutes, while traveling at ‘only’ subsonic speed” (Federation of American Scientists, 2000).

²⁰ Because of a probable lack of strategic depth, anarchists must maintain air superiority. This means developing a cutting-edge air force to prevent imperialists from waging war against them from the sky with drones and gunships. They may also opt for

Its small population leads Israel to assume calculated risks to end wars more quickly. It desires short wars for three reasons: First, “a speedy victory forestalls the intervention of other Arab states” (ibid., 38). Second, there is a “fear that indecisive warfare could result in snowballing material, human, and political costs” (ibid., 38). Third, “short wars that forestall Arab mobilization of superior quantitative resources, satisfies the Israeli aversion to ‘wars of attrition’” (ibid., 38). A long, drawn-out war favors large countries in which injured and killed soldiers are more readily replaced. This desire for short and decisive wars compels a more offensive approach to defense; thus Major General Israel Tal asserts that “the ‘few’ must adopt the principle of delivering the first blow” (ibid., 34).²¹

Defending Israel’s home front entails “enabling the continuity of the use of military force both for defense and offence... protection of vital national infrastructure... [and] protection of population centers” (Eizenkot, 2016, 26). The overarching aim is “the establishment of extended periods of security calm to enable the development of society, economy, and science” and to improve preparedness for war (ibid., 10). The first element of effective territorial defense is having “defensible borders.” Former foreign minister Abba Eban describes these as “borders which can be defended without a preemptive initiative” (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 26).

The importance of border defense for small countries rests on the fact that defending a small territory means one cannot afford to cede any of that territory to the enemy. Writing on Israel, Ben-Horin and Posen (1981, 19)

defense shields similar to Israel’s Iron Dome, which intercepts artillery shells and rockets, and its David’s Sling, which intercepts planes, drones, and missiles.

²¹ Small size also means no absolute end to all wars. Major General Israel Tal states that Israel “did not have the option of gaining a final and definite national decision by means of the military defeat of our enemies” (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 4), requiring eternal vigilance to ensure national survival. It is understood that “mere frustration of Arab efforts to destroy Israel will not in itself suffice to deter their continuation. The tremendous disparity in size and resources will sustain hopes of future success,” and “denial of sudden destruction does not foreclose the possibility of material and moral attrition to the same end” (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 13). Israel seeks to compel enemies to accept “resignation to the permanent existence” of itself (ibid.). Despite the IDF’s small size, its relative advantages include maneuverability, efficiency, high-quality intelligence gathering, and defense against high-trajectory fire (Eizenkot, 34–35). Its defense is based on “flexibility in the use of IDF forces within Israel’s borders, reduction of civilian vulnerability... [and] intelligence gathering and early warning systems” (Eizenkot, 25–26).

suggest, “Perhaps the most tangible and least disguisable among the necessarily imprecise criteria for ‘victory’ is the territorial factor. It is also the most symbolic. The Israelis therefore regard it as crucial that the Arabs not make territorial gains in a war, at the very least.” Thus IDF doctrine holds that “the entire border region must be treated as a permanently threatened region” (Eizenkot, 2016, 38). Borders that are more difficult to defend may invite attack and contribute to instability, as Ben-Horin and Posen (1981, 27) explain: “In the absence of defensible borders... there would be less slack to exploit in a crisis. Israel could not afford to accept the first blow. The tendency to preempt would rise, with concomitant problems for crisis stability.”²² The requirements of effectively defending the borders begin with a large standing army backed by reserve forces that can mobilize quickly.

3. The Standing Army

Murphy (2017, 223–24) suggests that the profit motive will lead private defense agencies to forgo standing armies in favor of small, capital-intensive fighting forces. In fact, he recommends it, fearing that a standing army might be turned against consumers.²³ The evidence suggests the possibility that a free society could survive without a standing army. About two dozen countries lack standing armies, including Iceland, Costa Rica, Dominica, Haiti, Granada, and Panama (Military Branches, 2017). Not that they are all defenseless: Faroe Islands and Greenland, for instance, are under the protection of Denmark and thus NATO, and the Vatican City is implicitly protected by Italy and NATO. Iceland is also in NATO, having joined on the

²² From Ben-Horin and Posen (1981, 26), the benefits of defensible borders are as follows:

- 1) Provide a margin of safety in surprise attacks.
- 2) Make the anarchist territory a more difficult target.
- 3) Enhance military options and increase flexibility.

²³ Whether capital intensive or labor intensive, whether in possession of conventional or nuclear weapons, any army capable of defending against foreign invaders is also capable of crossing the Rubicon and attacking its own people. The problem is not eliminated by substituting capital for labor or by abstaining from weapons of mass destruction. How to ensure that the incentives of private defense agencies will be such that they will refrain from aggressing against their own people for money and power remains up for discussion. Bizarrely, Murphy (2017, 229–30) recommends that the anarchists merely “cut a deal” with potential invaders in the absence of a defensive force. Clearly this approach will produce the opposite of the intended effect by encouraging aggressors to invade for the sake of extortion.

condition that it need not build a standing army of its own.²⁴ Liechtenstein, however, is not in NATO and has no standing army of its own, instead relying on Austria and Switzerland for its defense (Macias, 2018). Of the countries that do maintain standing armies, many possess only token forces by Western standards, yet they generally have maintained their autonomy over time. So perhaps a free society could survive with little or no military defense, under certain conditions: to state the obvious, the key to surviving without a standing army is to not be attacked.²⁵ The pertinent question is whether, having built no standing army, including a proper air force and coast guard, the anarchist society would remain at peace.

For reasons I describe in section 4, I believe an attack is reasonably likely.²⁶ I therefore reiterate my position in Newhard (2017, 60), which calls for reserve forces in support of a large standing army serving the roles of training, intelligence gathering, monitoring borders, repelling invasion, and activating the reserves. Unfortunately, mobilization of a large reserve force entails a high opportunity cost of lost output. In Israel, “the country’s economy is strained to the limit in times of emergency by the absence of the majority of all able-bodied civilian men, who constitute two-thirds of the IDF’s wartime strength” (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 7). Yet, in contrast

²⁴ Major mutual-defense treaties and alliances include the Collective Security Treaty Organization; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Council of South American Defense; the ANZUS Treaty; US defense treaties with Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea; and the United States–Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014 and the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding. The memorandum, approved by the Obama administration, provides Israel with \$38 billion over ten years with \$33 billion for foreign military financing and \$5 billion for missile-defense assistance. In the name of Israeli security, the United States has also provided billions of dollars in military and economic aid to Egypt since the 1979 Camp David Accords. US military aid to Jordan dates to 1957. In the Middle East, the United States also provides military aid to Israel’s northern neighbors Lebanon and Syria, and sells arms to Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman (Bearak and Gamio, 2016). This support is seen as greatly diminishing the benefits of the grants to Israel (Gazit, 2011, 4).

²⁵ Small countries that have been invaded by larger ones in recent years include (at the hands of the United States) Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, the Philippines, the Sahara, the Horn of Africa, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, and Cameroon, and (at the hands of Russia) Georgia, Ukraine, and Afghanistan.

²⁶ I concur with Kahn (1960, 642): “Insofar as the enemy is willing to gamble that [a country] will not go to war because it lacks an adequate civil or air defense program, war is brought nearer.”

with what Murphy recommends, Israel discovered a need for “substantially larger air and ground forces” after the 1973 war (*ibid.*, 5–6) despite its technologically advanced military. Even with a heavy reliance on 450,000 reserve personnel, Israel maintains a standing force of 180,000.

A small population and army would make the anarchist society particularly sensitive to casualties. Israel faces a similar situation because “small population renders it psychologically and materially vulnerable to manpower losses,” leading it to emphasize minimization of casualties (*ibid.*, 21). According to Ben-Horin and Posen (1981, 5–6), “Israel has always been vastly outnumbered in potential manpower,” and its small size and population make it vulnerable to surprise attacks and “extended strategies of attrition.” This has left it “searching for even more efficient use of an almost maximally tapped pool of manpower.” It has been able to reduce loss of life in combat by building more capital-intensive forces.²⁷

Murphy (2017, 226) observes that even if the United States invaded anarchist land, “the relevant metrics would not be the entire U.S. military budget versus the funds spent by the private defense agencies” since the former is spread out across the globe (and, I would add, suffers significant waste). Strategic sufficiency holds that “it is not necessary to match a nuclear-armed competitor in every measure of strategic nuclear capability,” and that the key to deterrence is maintaining a capability to retaliate after a surprise first strike (Denmark and Wirtz, 2005). It is an alternative to strategic superiority, which will not be attainable versus large empires such as the United States.²⁸ Yet, even if attacked by only a small part of the American armed forces, the invading society’s forces—even if only a single aircraft carrier—will still be formidable.²⁹

²⁷ The United States has done the same: “It is well known that the American military has sought to minimize casualties whenever possible by the substitution of firepower, even in cases such as Vietnam where firepower may have been inappropriate” (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 21–22).

²⁸ Maintaining a second-strike capability is critical to achieve stability. As described by Hoerber (1972), sufficiency entails four objectives:

- 1) Maintain an adequate second-strike capability to deter surprise first strikes.
- 2) Provide no incentive for the enemy to strike first.
- 3) Prevent the enemy from being able to cause greater destruction than one’s own country can.
- 4) Defend against small attacks.

²⁹ It is commonly said that each US aircraft carrier alone is more powerful than the air forces of 70 percent of the countries of the world. If the war in Afghanistan is

4. The Threat of Invasion

Newhard (2017, 58) asserts, “State invasion of anarchist territory should be considered inevitable.” Murphy (2017, 225–26) counters that states would only have one chief motive to invade: to destroy the anarchist society as a positive example to the world of the free market at work. He adds that such a motive would be a tough sell to that country’s citizens. Murphy underestimates the power of the propaganda that has led the United States to enter wars around the world in which the public had no legitimate interest. The invasion of Iraq is only one recent example. The explosion of the USS Maine, which may have originated internally, led to the Spanish-American War and the Philippine-American War. False stories about Central Powers’ soldiers were spread among the allied powers in World War I. The Gulf of Tonkin incident escalated the Vietnam War. Operation Northwoods, a proposed false flag against Cuba calling for violence against American civilians and soldiers, and Operation Washtub, in which the United States planted fake Soviet arms in Nicaragua, demonstrate that the government considers false-flag operations to be on the table and effective. Most Americans are rationally ignorant of foreign intervention including ongoing US operations in Africa and may be just as unaware of such operations directed against the anarchist society. The masses seem overwhelmingly uninterested in military operations that do not affect them directly. The state may also employ covert black operations to undermine the anarchist society, and dictators who do not answer to their people may also be a threat.

There are numerous reasons why a state might invade even a small anarchist society. If a state views the latter’s territory as a strategic location given the state’s geopolitical interests, it may want to invade. This may be particularly true if it views the anarchist society as weak, worrying that a power vacuum exists for a rival state to exploit. As a free society, the anarchist society may also become a major point of origin for drugs and

any indication, the anarchists could expect an initial airstrike followed by a land invasion. The airstrike of cruise missiles and bombs would target military bases, anti-aircraft weapon systems, communications, and radar. Cruise missiles could be launched from vehicles on land, airplanes, surface ships, and submarines. Bombs would be delivered by such aircraft as the B-1, B-52, F-15, and the B-2 stealth bomber. Once air superiority was achieved, Predator drones and AC-130 gunships might be used to kill anarchists from the air and ground troops could invade to expel defense agencies from the cities and seize assets such as air bases for themselves. To prevent this, anarchists must maintain superiority in the airspace above them with fighter jets and surface-to-air missiles.

weapons trafficking, provoking military action similar to US involvement in Latin America including Operation Just Cause, Plan Colombia, and the Merida Initiative. Potential prostitution, pornography, and unconventional hedonistic behavior in anarchist societies might also be cited to justify foreign intervention while concealing the imperialists' true motives. Recall that in addition to arms dealing, rumors of sexual irregularities perpetrated by David Koresh against children at Mount Carmel were enough to justify in the public's eye the mass murder of all the Branch Davidians, including the children.

Starting up an anarchist society on land claimed by a state would invite a response by the latter's military. For this reason, anarchists might want to start up in a weak state with no allies, or on uninhabited land, though this may leave them with less valuable land. If the anarchists desire a standard of living resembling what we now enjoy in the West, they will choose territory with fertile land, plentiful water, low-cost access to sea and land trading partners, and natural resources such as lumber, coal, and oil. These features also make the location desirable to states.³⁰ The anarchists will have to optimize, as choosing a better location means a greater likelihood of conflict.³¹

If the society is as productive as anarchists hope and statist fear, it may accumulate a significant amount of wealth including gold and silver; the incentive to control or invade would therefore increase over time. If gold alone does not motivate an attack, it will surely be confiscated after being attacked for other reasons. The discovery of valuable natural resources may also provoke an attack, especially if the find includes rare earth elements vital to defense systems or consumer products, or even just oil.

Murphy (2017, 227) argues that acquiring nuclear weapons could provide a *casus belli* for states to attack.³² He refers to the Cuban missile crisis as evidence that nuclear arms would provoke an invasion despite the fact that the presence of nuclear missiles in Cuba successfully deterred one. He also seems to believe a conventional force would not similarly provoke an attack despite the fact that the Bay of Pigs invasion and Operation Mongoose were directed at a nuclear-free Cuba. In recent years, surely nuclear weapons

³⁰ Some anarchists speak of seasteading, which I do not believe is a viable alternative. Anarchists do not want a country that can be destroyed with a single torpedo.

³¹ The founding of Israel from 1947 to 1948 may be instructive, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.

³² "A *casus belli* is an event that may be the cause and alleged justification of a general war or a large-scale military action" (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 16).

have played a role in the hesitancy of the United States and South Korea to invade North Korea. It is doubtful that the United States would have invaded Iraq if Saddam Hussein had had nuclear weapons. The allegation of chemical weapons in Iraq was one of the justifications for invading, and also reveals that states do not fear all weapons of mass destruction equally: nuclear weapons are still the gold standard of deterrence.³³

A standing army does not guarantee a society's survival if the society is attacked. If there are enemies to engage, the probability of survival is certainly higher with an army than without one. The particular circumstances matter: Liechtenstein survives with no military of its own, yet it would be just as absurd for Israel to adopt Liechtenstein's military posture as it would be for Liechtenstein to adopt Israel's. The question is which scenario anarchist society will more closely resemble. Above I make the case that in many ways relevant to national defense it will resemble modern Israel and that the anarchist society would therefore benefit by adopting Israeli weapons and tactics. In the next section, I describe Israel's strategic doctrine in detail.

5. Disproportionate Force

Israel's strategic doctrine calls for a "defensive strategy, executed offensively" (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 12). Major operational elements of the doctrine include "a strong commitment to the offensive" and "high regard for the advantages of preemption and speed in conduct of wars," among other things (*ibid.*, 29). Lacking strategic depth and surrounded on three sides by powerful rivals, Israel relies on taking the initiative to survive. Emphasizing the importance of "decisive victory," it believes "that the enemy cannot be defeated through defense. Therefore, offensive force is needed to achieve clear military results" (Eizenkot, 2016, 10). As noted by Ben-Horin and Posen (1981, 29), "Offensive operations are believed by the IDF to compensate for Israel's overall numerical inferiority. By seizing the operational initiative it can dictate the place and pace of events. The IDF would concentrate forces at chosen points, attain local parity or even superiority, and seek decisive operational victory by swift disruption or destruction of enemy forces at critical junctures."

³³ Responding to the claim that "defenses will be destabilizing because they will increase incentives for one side to strike first in a crisis," a study by the RAND Corporation finds this to be false if offensive forces are small and invulnerable (Thomson, 1984, 2). At worst, the effect is ambiguous since the perceived benefit of attacking is higher but so is the perceived cost.

The authors add that pursuing defense in an offensive manner “[renders the enemy] reactive, always a step behind the action or away from it.” Israeli brigadier general A. Kahalani advises,

Our doctrine believes that the best defense is a good offense. Most of our training was on how to attack. Our ideology preaches that if you attack, you have more of a chance for success. Israeli tacticians teach that you really can’t achieve a victory through defense, so it was not emphasized in our service schools. The defense is very dangerous because it gives the initiative to the attacker. We, the defender, are forced to react to all the actions that the attacker makes (*ibid.*, 32).

At the heart of this ostensible aggressiveness is a desire for peace through deterrence. As Ben-Horin and Posen (1981, 30) note, “It is only through a demonstrated capability for offensive operations that Israel can credibly threaten the decisive operational victories that are central to her deterrence doctrine. The same capability is also seen as the only assured Israeli means of forcing an end to a war, thus reducing its costs.” If deterrence fails, it is Israel’s desire to return to peacetime quickly. Aggression is embraced out of the belief that wars “would otherwise continue indefinitely, or end only temporarily” until the enemies were resupplied and new allies brought into their coalition (*ibid.*, 30).

Similarly, with the ultimate aim of deterrence, Newhard (2017, 63) calls for aggressive defense tactics including “preemptive attacks on troop buildups on the outskirts of anarchist lands... [and] engaging individual enemy units that have not yet attacked in a battle.” It also calls for “[taking] the fight to an approaching potential enemy” and first-strike counterforce attacks, noting that “the element of surprise improves the kill ratio and permits one to knock out some of the enemy’s weapons before they can be used in the counterattack” (*ibid.*, 68–71). Likewise, “Israeli strategists have long stressed the importance of striking first in the face of a major imminent threat,” referred to as a “preemptive counter-offensive” or “anticipatory counter-attack” (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 34). Its enemies with large standing armies are “potentially capable of making a swift transition to attack from their peacetime positions in order to exploit the small size of Israel’s standing army and disrupt the mobilization of the reserves” (*ibid.*, 5). Preemption transfers the battle to enemy territory, increasing the enemy’s costs; it denies the enemy the opportunity to use its battle plans and forces it to improvise; and it disrupts or prevents the mobilization of enemy forces. These outcomes “neutralize the numerical advantage of the enemy coalition” (*ibid.*, 34).

History reveals the importance of taking the initiative rather than waiting until the enemy aggresses. “Between 1948 and 1967, major Israeli interests were vulnerable to “nonviolent” actions, such as diversion of the Jordan River tributaries in the north... The Israelis [also] considered their borders “indefensible” in the event of Arab concentration of offensive forces along them” (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 17), a scenario in which Newhard (2017, 63) calls for preemption even if aggression is not certain or imminent. A stated policy of preemption also warns enemies to avoid threatening behavior since such behavior could cause a war even if their intent is only to intimidate the anarchists into assuming costly defensive measures. Private defense companies may draw lines in the sand warning rivals of what kind of actions they consider provocative. Such warnings “lessen the possibilities of miscalculation leading to unintentional escalation, ... provide a clear signal to [the people] that ‘the deterrence system’ is no longer effective and that military action is called for, [and] lay the basis for international legitimization of military action” (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 16–17). Additionally, “the more geographically vulnerable Israel becomes, the more it can be expected to rely on hard-nosed *casus belli* to bridge the gap between a policy that aims to deter the outbreak of war and an operational doctrine that stresses the advantages of preemption or ‘anticipatory’ offensive war” (ibid., 18).

The disadvantages of a purely defensive posture are heightened if the defender lacks strategic depth, in which case it is of even greater importance that the battle be taken to the enemy’s homeland. Newhard (2017, 63–64) therefore proposes that anarchists “take the fight to the enemy territory to minimize the destruction of their own territory,” reasoning that “allowing statist invaders to fight their wars away from home spares them the worst costs of war.” He adds, “The anarchists may find that taking the battle to the invader’s home country is preferable, the NAP be damned.” Regardless of Murphy’s (2017, 221) objection, Israel’s experience has led it to embrace exactly this: Ben-Horin and Posen (1981, 33) report that statements by soldiers and politicians indicate that “the IDF will swiftly carry the battle deep into enemy territory” and that “the standing forces of the IDF have been enlarged to facilitate “prompt counter-offensive operations” or even a “substantial preemptive strike.” The authors also cite former Israeli defense minister E. Weizman as asserting, “If they fight us on the eastern front we shall not sit there in our bunkers and shoot from them at the attacking tanks, but rather [we shall] cross the lines. This is the minimum we have to do, especially in view of the quantities of modern weaponry the other side possesses.” Similarly, Israel Tal insists on the principle of “first strike” and “offensive operations” deep in enemy territory, once the country is seriously threatened (ibid., 33). According to Ben-Horin and Posen (1981, 30), “Offensive action deep inside enemy territory is seen as the only strategic

defense option available to the IDF... It seeks to concentrate its efforts against the enemy who poses the greatest immediate threat and vanquish him by means of offensive operations.”³⁴ This strategy has contributed to Israel’s security and prosperity for seventy years. The same goes for the United States, where many Americans take for granted the strategic advantage of their uniquely isolated position, far from the battlefields of most of the wars the country has waged.

Recognizing the utility of aggressiveness,³⁵ Israel relies on intelligence and early-warning systems so they may respond to attacks before they begin. Israel exhibits a “willingness to use violent force as a first option,” such as in the Six-Day War in 1967, when “Israel responded to Arab troop buildup with an effective pre-emptive strike against Egyptian airfields.” After observing warning signs of an impending strike, Israel destroyed Egypt’s air force before Egypt could attack it:

Egypt announced hostility to Israel; set its military to its highest alertness level; expelled UN emergency forces from the shared Sinai Border; strengthened its forces on the same border; closed the important Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships; and fomented a more favorable balance of power by signing alliances with Iraq, Jordan, and Syria.... The response to these threats was a swift and decisive attack in which 90% of Egypt’s air force was suddenly destroyed without warning. A similar attack was also conducted in Syria. (Goldstein, 2016)

In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel was caught off guard by a surprise attack as Egypt crossed the Suez Canal and Syria invaded the Golan Heights. In the first day, hundreds of Israeli soldiers were killed, and fifty fighter jets and five hundred tanks were destroyed. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan proposed the nuclear option, which was rejected by Prime Minister Golda Meir. Instead, Israel was able to achieve victory with conventional weapons thanks in part to Operation Nickel Grass, the US airlift arranged by US secretary of state Henry Kissinger (see Cohen, 2003), which included one hundred F-4 Phantom fighter jets as well as tanks, artillery, and ammunition.

³⁴ Ben-Horin and Posen (1981, 29): “The maxim of ‘carrying the battle into the enemy’s territory’ embodied Israel’s solution to the vulnerability of the long 1949 armistice lines and the absence of strategic depth. Defense was judged either impossible or too risky in view of the potentially disastrous consequences of even tactical retreat from those lines. The offensive was therefore seen by the Israelis as not only ‘the best form of defense,’ but—for them—the *only* one.”³⁴

³⁵ “In all situations the Israelis rely either on preventive attacks or massive retaliation” (Brown, 1981).

Israel also plans for operations in countries with no common borders, including strikes on facilities in target countries (Eizenkot, 2016, 30). On June 7, 1981, in Operation Babylon, Israel carried out a surprise air strike destroying the Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction near Baghdad. This attack commenced the Begin doctrine, Israel's policy of preventive strikes on the weapons of mass destruction of their enemies. The following day, a statement from the government asserted, "On no account shall we permit an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against the people of Israel" (Reuters, 1981).

Israel also emphasizes the importance of achieving "decisive victory" when deterrence fails to avoid drawn-out wars of attrition and to deter further attacks. Although it is known that no single military victory will ever solve its security problem, it is important to clearly defeat the enemy in any military encounter: "crushing defeat of their adversaries by offensive operations in the enemy's own territory is seen by the Israelis as their only reliable means of ending a war altogether, to prevent its becoming a drawn out slugging match" (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 18). This explains the sentiment that "we must conclude our wars with the advantage clearly on our side. The Arabs must be the losers" (ibid., 19). Israel seeks to "project both the capability to deny, by defensive and disarming operations, and the capability to punish, by substantial destruction of Arab armies and occasional infliction of strategic damage beyond the battlefield" (ibid., 14).³⁶

Of course, the ultimate aim of this strategic doctrine is to deter. Lieutenant General Yigal Allon believes "only an army capable of winning would have the power to deter... The hope to deter depended not on military strength alone but on the credibility of using it at the proper time and in a decisive way" (ibid., 20), up to and including totally destroying the

³⁶ "Israelis have come to put increasingly greater emphasis on IDF punishment of the enemy, militarily and economically... and escalate hostilities where necessary to avoid 'playing' on Arab terms" (Ben-Horin and Posen, 1981, 15). Failure to communicate the will to respond to provocations is believed by some to have diminished the credibility of Israeli deterrence (ibid., 15). The authors continue, "War outcome itself becomes an integral element of future deterrence... Both the short run and the long run require *clear IDF conventional military superiority* over its adversaries" (ibid., 16). This requires that the IDF "apply its superiority, whenever deterrence fails, in an offensive operational mode and in pursuit of indisputable military victory" (ibid., 16). The last line of anarchist defense should be modeled after the rumored Samson Option, in which the Israeli armed forces would launch a massive retaliatory attack with weapons of mass destruction against an invading country as a last resort.

enemy.³⁷ Since war would be so destructive,³⁸ successfully deterring invasions is of the utmost importance.

In summary, anarchists are well advised to follow Israel's example, which has empowered it to overcome existential threats since its founding in 1948. As with Israel, the anarchists' objective is first to deter, and second to achieve quick and decisive victory when attacked. To this end, they must build a military of shields and swords, developing both defensive and offensive weapons. They must acquire nuclear weapons while openly rejecting the doctrine of "no first use," and accept the necessity of taking the battle to the homeland of any invading force. They must clearly communicate to the world that even nonviolent provocation will be considered a *casus belli* justifying preemption. Establishing a reputation for responding to intimidation, threats, and attacks with preemptive and preventive strikes and massive retaliation will deter most provocations and maximize the probability of David defeating Goliath if attacked.³⁹ Once hostilities have commenced, the anarchist society must work to quickly achieve decisive victory. By rejecting the doctrine of dogmatic nonaggression and adopting a strategic doctrine of disproportionate force, anarchists will reduce the likelihood that they will be attacked at all, leaving them free to live their lives productively and in peace.

³⁷ This is known as the *Dahiyah* doctrine. Gadi Eisenkot asserts, "We will wield disproportionate power against every village from which shots are fired on Israel, and cause immense damage and destruction. From our perspective, these are military bases... This isn't a suggestion. This is a plan that has already been authorized." He adds, "This strike has to be carried out as quickly as possible, through prioritizing strikes at its assets, rather than chasing after launch sites. Such a response is likely to be remembered by decision makers in Syria and Lebanon for many years, thus deepening deterrence" (Harel, 2008).

³⁸ Lack of a capital city or government assets would mean targeting by enemy forces would be of private defense headquarters, field offices, bases, and perhaps industry, civil structures, and infrastructure; they might wage what from the anarchists' perspective would effectively be a total war. The lack of a capital city would not deter attack: the invader would simply bring a defenseless civilian population to its knees and then set up its own police state, controlling roads and utilities. States would demand submission and offer the alternative of starvation.

³⁹ "Since the emphasis has to be on making certain that in the event of enemy attack some bombs at least are delivered in retribution one wants these bombs to be, and thus to appear before the event, as horrendous as possible" (Brodie, 1958, 26). The more horrendous retaliation can be made, the less likely an invasion becomes.

6. Final Thoughts

Conflict comes with living in a world of scarcity. Anarchists cannot wish away threats to their autonomy nor base their strategic doctrine on the assumption that they are immune from attack. The possibility of being invaded will always exist. A single defeat in battle could mean the end of the free society, and no single victory could secure it forever. Yet the anarchists wish to live in peace. To do so, they must have a defense force capable of defeating the enemy, and they must credibly threaten its use; this is the most reliable means of deterring attacks altogether. In this paper, I argue that the requirements of such a force include a standing army, nuclear weapons, and a strategic doctrine of disproportionate force. The anarchists must be willing to launch preventive and preemptive strikes, escalate conflicts, take the fight to the enemy's homeland, and achieve quick and decisive victory. Although this precludes extending the NAP to rivals, the ultimate objective is deterrence: such a military might see no hostilities at all as long as it is viewed by rivals as powerful and credible.

A strategic doctrine of disproportionate force will not be without its critics among anarchists, and some will also object to invoking Israel as a model to be emulated. However, Israel's continued survival since 1948 demonstrates the doctrine's effectiveness even when defending a relatively small territory of only a few million residents (in 1970, Israel's population was just under 3 million, compared to 35 million in Egypt and over 6.3 million in Syria). Detractors must either counter that Israel at the time of the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War does not parallel what anarchists will face or explain how Israel's adoption of a more passive strategic doctrine would have been superior when Egypt amassed its military along Israel's border in the Sinai Peninsula in 1967, for example. Could Israel have achieved victory after the two-front surprise attack of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 with a defense budget along the lines of what Murphy (2017, 226) proposes, or through nonviolent resistance (*ibid.*, 229–30)? Does the possession of nuclear weapons, or preventive strikes on the nuclear facilities of rivals, somehow undermine Israel's security? Anarchists opposed to the ruthless foreign policy outlined above should explain why a doctrine of dogmatic nonaggression would be superior to what has been proven to be effective in the real world even when Israel faced off against much larger enemies who were supplied with advanced weapons by the Soviet Union.

Like Israel's military planners, this paper advocates a *realpolitik* worldview, holding that "states cannot be entirely sure of the actions of other states... [and] the way to ensure continued existence against such uncertainty is through power" (Goldstein, 2016). As General Ehud Barak put it, "Until the wolf shall lay with the lamb, we'd better be wolves" (*ibid.*, 2016). This

paper also concurs with George Washington: “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual ways of preserving peace.” This same principle was also known to the Romans: *Si vis pacem, para bellum* (“He... who desires peace, prepare for war”; Vegetius, 2011).⁴⁰ To survive, the anarchist society must become a gentle giant: powerful enough to deter or respond to attacks, yet civilized enough to refrain from needlessly attacking others.

Lastly, at the time of writing it does not appear that market anarchism is imminent. At best, anarchist theory describes a society of the future, not the present. As a result, my analysis of such a society’s feasibility relies in part on projections of the future conditions under which it might arise. One of my assumptions is that the current multistate system is unsustainable in the long run and will give way to a world government. This government will monopolize weapons of war including nuclear weapons and will not allow independence or peaceful secession. In this scenario, only war can preserve an anarchist society or any free and independent state. In the long run, both Israel and any emergent anarchist lands will face security threats from such a government. Consequently, I am interested in whether pockets of freedom can be preserved for the few while the rest of the world submits to a supreme authority, especially if the combined powers of the world work together to erase from history any independent holdouts. For the future of freedom, one can only hope that these future rebels adopt a strategic doctrine that puts the defense of their families, nations, culture, and liberties above all else.

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⁴⁰ Another Latin phrase, *Nemo me impune lacessit* (“No one attacks me with impunity”), would make for an appropriate private-defense-company slogan.

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