A LIBERTARIAN RE-EXAMINATION OF EARLY 19TH-CENTURY POLITICS IN BRAZIL

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Introduction

Brazil’s independence and state-building process was unique in the Americas. While other countries severed relations with their former metropolis in revolutionary processes, Brazil maintained a strong sense of continuity with Portugal. Dom Pedro I, Brazil’s first head of state and government, was a son of Dom João VI, Portugal’s prince regent. Both came from Europe in the early nineteenth century to evade the Napoleonic Wars. Instead of fighting a war in Portugal he believed he could not win, Dom João decided to simply uproot the capital of the Portuguese Empire and plant it in Rio de Janeiro, displacing his family and court completely.

After Napoleon’s defeat, Dom João pranced back to Portugal, but Pedro stayed in Brazil and was eventually central in Brazil’s move to independence. He soon came to be emperor of Brazil and, after reigning for less than a decade, returned to Portugal in 1831. He left his son, Dom Pedro II, to become Brazil’s second emperor. Pedro II would reign until 1889, when he was overthrown by a military coup that established a Republican regime.

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CITATION INFORMATION FOR THIS ARTICLE:
Traditional historiography in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries praises this continuity between Portugal and Brazil, sometimes in contrast with Spanish America’s history. In its negotiated independence and state-building process, Brazil avoided the dangers of mob rule, oligarchy, despotism, and even territorial fragmentation. This process, conservative in nature, displeased radical liberals, but nevertheless was successful in achieving progress and order.

More recent historiography questions this traditional view, observing that the Conservative state-building process was unable to and possibly uninterested in addressing social and economic issues, such as slavery. Instead, the process sustained inequalities that scarred the country, which helps explain future problems. But even with this criticism, the new historiography also praises the way Brazilian elites were able to avoid some of the consequences associated with Spanish America’s path to independence. A supporter of this sentiment is José Murilo de Carvalho, author of *Elite and State Building in Imperial Brazil* (published in Brazil as *A Construção da Ordem/Teatro de Sombras—Construction of the Order/Shadow Theatre*). Carvalho says that unlike any other country in Latin America, Brazil had a homogenous elite responsible for the independence movement and subsequent state-building process. The unification of this elite was accomplished through a common education (mainly at the University of Coimbra, in the late 1700s), a common vocation in the bureaucracy, and few ideological differences. In other words, some intellectuals threw themselves into shaping a South American empire out of Brazil, thus ensuring the maintenance of order.

Although Carvalho praises the way Brazilian elites avoided territorial fragmentation, mob rule, despotism, and other difficulties, he fails to address the dangerously authoritarian political attitude dominant in Brazil. To impose order, the elites in Rio de Janeiro assumed a monopoly of the legal use of violence. This process involved alienating opposing elites, and establishing the right to “tax”—a term that in this context could be considered mere theft. These are basic libertarian observations that both traditional and modern historiographies overlook.

When I highlight these aspects of Brazilian political history, I am in no way saying they were the only ones to make this mistake in the state-building process. Just the opposite is true. Even the United States, a country often

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1 José Murilo de Carvalho, *A Construção da Ordem e Teatro de Sombras*.
2 I do not have the space to go further into this discussion, but I am drawing here on the work of writers like Robert Higgs.
mentioned as an example of a free nation, failed in similar respects. What I am trying to convey is that this was also the case in Brazil, something other researchers fail to mention clearly.

With this in mind, I aim to provide a libertarian reexamination of nineteenth-century politics in Brazil. I achieve this mainly by explaining central aspects of the political system in Brazil. My findings overall show that Brazilian politics was mostly dominated by a Conservative mentality that leaned dangerously away from individual liberty, as advocated by classical liberalism, and instead favored more authoritarian forms of government. In other words, within a framework of the state versus its citizens, Brazilian politics highly valued the state—at least in its first decades. A major issue that sprung from the seemingly omnipotent state government was an unbalanced, biased stance on slavery.

Due to space restrictions and for the sake of a deeper analysis, this text focuses mainly on the first decades of Brazilian history. It is mostly based on secondary sources, but also draws on primary sources on Brazilian political thought. This article will, I hope, offer a breath of fresh air to a mostly Marxist, or at least statist, historiography.

Thankfully, there are authors who write about Brazil in the nineteenth century in a framework close to the one used in this paper. In *A Outra Independência*, Evaldo Cabral de Mello questions the historiography of Brazil's independence, which is usually centered on Rio de Janeiro. Through this work he shows how a more decentralized (or confederate) project, emanating from the northeast, was also in place. Roderick J. Barman also questions the historiography by showing how Brazilian unity, vaunted by the elites in Rio de Janeiro, was actually rooted in political propaganda. Jorge Caldeira writes a market-friendly history in *História do Brasil com Empreendedores*, and other books as well. Even José Murilo de Carvalho has written more favorably of individual freedoms in his other works. These are but a few examples.

The novelty I hope to introduce here is the combination of a libertarian theoretical framework and the already-existing research material. One of my

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3 For literature on how violence was used in the U.S. state-building process, I suggest Thomas J. DiLorenzo, especially *Hamilton’s Curse: How Jefferson’s Arch Enemy Betrayed the American Revolution—and What It Means for Americans Today.*

4 Evaldo Cabral de Mello, *A outra Independência: o federalismo pernambucano de 1817 a 1824.*


main goals is to study Brazilian history based on this framework, and I hope this text encourages others to reread Brazilian history in a similar way.

A Brief History of Brazilian Politics in the Early Nineteenth Century

For those unfamiliar with Brazilian history, from 1822 to 1889 Brazil was an empire, unlike any other country on the continent. During this period the country was ruled by two monarchs: Dom Pedro I, son of Dom João VI, king of Portugal, and later, Dom Pedro II, son of Dom Pedro I. Dom Pedro I (b. 1798) fled Portugal with his family in 1808 to escape the Napoleonic armies invading the Iberian Peninsula. His family returned to Portugal after Napoleon’s defeat, but he stayed in Brazil, where he eventually proclaimed the country’s independence. This sequence of events was without parallel anywhere in the Americas—just imagine King George III’s son proclaiming the United States’ independence, or Ferdinand VII proclaiming the independence of any other country in Latin America.

While emperor of Brazil, Dom Pedro I maintained close connections with his family in Europe, much to the despair of many Brazilian elites, who saw this as a threat to the country’s independence. A liberal in outlook, he eventually returned to Portugal, where he succeeded his father as Dom Pedro IV in 1826, though he abdicated that throne, leaving it to his daughter, Maria. In Portugal, he clashed with his brother Dom Miguel I, a true absolutist.

Dom Pedro II (born in Brazil in 1825) ascended to the Brazilian throne in 1831, when he was only a child. He did not govern the country immediately: Brazil went through a period of regencies until 1840, by which time Dom Pedro II had grown into adulthood. Even leaving aside the period of regencies, Dom Pedro II had one of the longest reigns of any monarch in modern history.\(^7\)

But Brazil’s independence was not merely family business. Historians generally understand that for much of the nineteenth century Brazil had two major political parties: the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party.\(^8\) But during Dom Pedro I’s reign, the country had no formal political parties (with platforms, rules of association, and so on). Instead it had political societies and political tendencies. These revolved mostly around the monarch himself: politicians, dubbed sometimes as absolutists or despotic, supported Dom

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\(^7\) For comparison, Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom recently became the longest-reigning British monarch, with a reign of over sixty-three years.

\(^8\) For a classical account of Brazilian political history see Joaquim Nabuco, *Um estadista do Império: Nabuco de Aranjo: sua vida, suas opiniões, sua época*. 
Pedro I’s rule. Others, labeled sometimes as radicals, opposed it. Only during the regencies, after Dom Pedro I’s resignation, and especially after his death in Portugal in 1834, did these societies and tendencies become real political parties.

The regencies were at least initially periods of liberal reforms, or rather, decentralizing reforms. Dom Pedro I’s opponents condemned him and the constitution of 1824 for collecting too much power in the court. In response, one of the major victories of the opposition was the Additional Act of 1834. This was an amendment to the Brazilian constitution of 1824 that enhanced the autonomy of the provinces. Thus, early Brazilian political disputes were similar to those between Hamiltonian Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans: disputes about more central power or more local autonomy.\(^9\)

The initial platforms of the political parties were, in part, reflection of this.

The first political party to be formally established in Brazil was the Conservative Party. The Conservatives themselves tell this story: after Dom Pedro I left, the country went through a difficult period. The 1830s were a time of anarchy in Brazil, which faced the ongoing prospect of suffering the same fate as Spanish America: endless civil war, fragmentation into small entities, and rule by local caudillos.\(^10\) In response, former supporters and adversaries of Dom Pedro I came together under the leadership of Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos, a former adversary of the monarch, to establish a coalition against the more radical, anarchist, or democratic (derogatory terms in this context\(^11\)) elements in Brazilian politics. So was born the Conservative Party. This party was soon dubbed “Saquarema,” and its affiliates “saquaremas,” after the municipality of Saquarema, in the province of Rio de Janeiro, only a few miles east of the city. Some of the most important leaders of the party met there.

The Liberal Party was born in opposition to the Conservative. Liberals saw Dom Pedro I’s abdication and most of the other political actions in the

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9 For an account of this debate see Joseph J. Ellis, *Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation*.


11 The fear of democracy can be found for example in the public speeches of Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos. See João Camilo de Oliveira Torres, *Os construtores do Império: Ideais e lutas do Partido Conservador*, p. 55.
1830s as victories for the country, despite the turmoil that came with them. One of the greatest early Brazilian liberal leaders was Diogo Antônio Feijó, a heterodox Catholic priest and regent of the empire from October 1835 to September 1837. Feijó appears remarkably like a Brazilian version of Thomas Jefferson: in light of regional rebellions during the regencies, his liberalism went so far as to allow rebellious provinces to secede. He was removed from office by Vasconcelos and his associates in favor of Pedro de Araújo Lima (future Marquis of Olinda), another Conservative leader.

During Lima’s regency (1837-40) the Conservatives led the movement called Regress (Portuguese: Regresso), through which most of the decentralizing reforms of the Additional Act of 1834 were undone, particularly by the Interpretation Act of May 12, 1840. In response to Regress, Feijó’s supporters grew into an even more radical opposition to Dom Pedro I’s former supporters. Sadly, it was too late; Dom Pedro II’s early reign, especially during the 1840s and 1850s, was a period of Conservative dominion. Decree n. 523 of July 20, 1847, created the office of president of the Council of Ministers, or prime minister for short. From this point on, Dom Pedro II was restricted to choosing a prime minister, who in turn chose the other ministers, who in turn—thanks to electoral laws and other devices—had major influence in elections and appointments to every other public office, from senators and congressmen to policy officers and justices of the peace. Even in the 1870s, Liberals only came to power through coalitions with the Conservatives, which were proposed by the Conservatives themselves. To see a purebred Liberal in higher office was rare. The party was soon dubbed “Luzia,” and its affiliates “luzias” after the municipality of Santa Luzia in the province of Minas Gerais. There the Liberals were defeated in 1842 in one final military revolt against the Conservatives.

To sum up: as historians generally understand, during Dom Pedro I’s reign Brazil had three major political tendencies: a radical opposition to the monarch (sometimes dubbed “left”); a moderate opposition (“center”); and a

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12 For an account of Feijó’s life and political thought see Diogo Antônio Feijó, *Diogo Antônio Feijó*.
13 For an account of this conservative prominence see Ilmar Rohloff De Mattos, *O Tempo Saquarema*.
14 Francisco Belisario Soares de Souza, *O sistema eleitoral no império: com apêndice contendo a legislação eleitoral no período 1821-1889*.
group of supporters (“right”). Dom Pedro I’s resignation from office and return to Portugal in 1831 was seen as a victory for radicals and still more so for moderates, and both rapidly assumed power. Supporters were left aside, even more so after Dom Pedro I’s death in 1834, which signified the death of any hope for restoration of his reign. While some moderates were happy with the initial reforms of the 1830s, others started to see them as dangerous steps toward anarchy. These “right-wing” moderates joined former supporters of Dom Pedro I to establish the Conservative Party. In response, the “left-wing” moderates approached former radicals to form the Liberal Party.

Analyzing Brazilian Politics from a Libertarian Point of View

The story told so far reflects the general tendency of Brazilian scholars and Brazilianists to divide nineteenth-century Brazilian political groups along a left-right political spectrum: The more radical opposition demanded reforms on the left. This radical (or far-left) group was the republicans, who clamored for the death of the monarchy inherited from Portugal. The more conservative or even reactionary group was on the right. In this case, the more reactionary group (or the far right) demanded absolutism, or more specifically, rule without a constitution, a demand very few people supported—even Dom Pedro I was not among them. In the center of this political spectrum sat a group of moderates, who defended policies both from the right and left. These moderates (or centrists) defended a parliamentary constitutional monarchy modeled after England.

Attempts to make Brazilian politics in the nineteenth century conform to a left-right political spectrum encounter difficulties; the main issues lie in the definition of a Conservative or a Liberal. Of course, on the surface, a Conservative is a politician affiliated with the Conservative Party and a Liberal a politician affiliated to the Liberal Party, but what does a “true” Conservative look like? Furthermore, what kind of policy does she defend? The difficulty of noticing major differences among the parties led Brazilian politician Antônio Francisco de Paula de Holanda Cavalcanti de Albuquerque

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17 There are many examples of this tendency. To mention just a few: Oliveira Vianna, O Idealismo da Constituição; Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, Ordem Burguesa e Liberalismo Político; Gildo Marçal Brandão, Linhagens do pensamento político brasileiro; Luis Werneck Vianna, “Americanistas e Iberistas: a polêmica de Oliveira Viana com Tavares Bastos.”
(1797-1863) to famously state that “nothing is more like a Saquarema than a Luzia in power.” The phrase indicates Cavalcanti’s frustration with the lack of meaningful differences between the two parties, especially when it came to actually holding power. He shared this feeling with other people at the time. Historians conclude that the great divide between the parties was indeed the debate over centralization or decentralization. Another approach is to say that both parties were liberal: one liberal-liberal and the other conservative-liberal. The parties agreed on the policies to be implemented, but disagreed about the pace of such reforms: Liberals wanted the reforms to happen faster, Conservatives wanted them to happen more gradually. Liberals were afraid of despotism, caesarism, or absolutism. Conservatives were afraid of anarchy, democracy, or mob rule.

One irony in forcing Brazilian politics in the nineteenth century onto a left-right political spectrum is that many Brazilian politicians from the nineteenth century would probably appreciate it. In both the Conservative and Liberal Parties there were those who vehemently believed they were serving a moderate’s cause: avoiding the extremes of both anarchy and despotism. The golden mean—the desirable middle between excess and deficiency—is an ancient theme in philosophy that nineteenth-century political thinkers much appreciated, and Brazilian politicians were no exception. However, by using a similar schema—an extreme left and an extreme right with a desirable center in the middle—contemporary political analysts make the mistake of unquestioningly accepting the narrative of the past instead of questioning it. I do not mean to question that narrative in a radical or critical-theory sense, but just to examine whether the narrative

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18 This phrase is mentioned in many sources, but I have been unable to find the original.

19 An example of this is the already-mentioned Ilmar Rohloff De Mattos, O Tempo Saquarema. Carvalho reaches a similar conclusion.


21 D.P. Kidder and J.C. Fletcher, Brazil and the Brazilians, portrayed in Historical and Descriptive Sketches, pp. 183-84.


23 An ancient example of that can be found in book X of The Republic, by Plato, where Socrates says that a man “must know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as far as possible.” Edmund Burke can be mentioned as a modern example of that when he condemns the radical changes of the French Revolution but at the same time praises the gradual reforms of the American Revolution. See Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France: A Critical Edition.
corresponds to the facts. It is also important to consider the possibility that one of the extremes was correct, therefore making the other incorrect, such that the moderates, far from being wise in avoiding extremes, were doing a disfavor to a just cause. What I mean is this: people at the time were afraid to espouse “extreme” political positions. There was a tendency to go directly to the middle, believing that that would be the right place. But perhaps being in the middle meant being half right, but also half wrong.

Another problem with the left-right political spectrum is that it accepts the party labels of the time as a political reality. On close examination, one can easily see that politicians in the Liberal Party were not classical liberals and that politicians in the Conservative Party were not conservative in a Burkean sense. Even the Republican Party that emerged in the 1870s was sometimes relatively oligarchic. More than that, the existence of so few political parties during such a long period made it difficult for some aspirations to be represented. For example, the original core of the Conservative Party established an early partnership with the coffee growers and slave owners in the province of Rio de Janeiro, because the Conservative state project needed the farmers’ money. However, further west, approaching the province of São Paulo, this connection became less mutually beneficial. Nevertheless, until the end of the monarchy there was a connection between Conservatives and Fluminense aristocrats.

Although several modifications were made in electoral law during the empire, some characteristics endured: slaves could not vote, and among the free, hardly 10 percent participated in the franchise. Being a voter provided an illusion of freedom, much like in other Western countries. The people had little representation in either party, however. Some analyses try to find

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24 This is, at least, my interpretation. I am not saying Edmund Burke was unknown in Brazil, but that he was used instrumentally—that is, only when it was convenient for other interests. See Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos, Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos.

25 George C. A. Boehrer, Da monarquia à república: história do Partido Republicano do Brasil—1870-1889. This work was originally a doctoral thesis presented to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in the Catholic University of America. It has an English version: George C. A. Boehrer, From Monarchy to Republic: A History of the Republican Party of Brazil.

26 Carvalho himself observes this. See Carvalho, 2014, pp. 263-86, 377, 381.


28 Francisco Belisario Soares de Souza. O sistema eleitoral no império: com apêndice contendo a legislação eleitoral no período 1821-1889.
in the social and economic origins of the voters and politicians the logic behind their political parties and policies, but this approach can lead to superficial conclusions, especially when guided by a Marxist theoretical framework. One example of this is the work of Caio Prado Jr., who sees both parties as nothing more than representatives of different sectors of the bourgeoisie. Nelson Werneck Sodré also draws from Marxism and concludes there was no real difference among the parties. Raymundo Faoro comes to a conclusion closer to the one I present here when he says that the Conservative Party was the main representative of the bureaucratic sector. Azevedo Amaral and Afonso Arinos also do this when they notice a correlation between the Conservative Party and rural interests, mainly in the Southeast.

It is clear that the core of the Conservative Party was an alliance between landlords of the Southeast and bureaucrats. Furthermore, at the core of the Liberal Party stood liberal professionals and landlords from other parts of the country. Statistics in this area can be helpful, but they can also be misleading (statistics are only as good as the theoretical framework used to analyze them). Some analyses arrive at a dead end by trying to find a straight connection between parties and social or economic groups. That is one of the major flaws I see in Carvalho’s thesis: to conclude that the Conservative Party was, in some manner, a hostage of the landlords and slaveholders because of the party’s need for money to build the state is wrong. What was important was the bureaucracy, independent from any political, economic, or social group. This is not to say the bureaucrats were not in an alliance with landlords (and slaveholders), or that they were not represented mostly in the Conservative Party. Rather, they were not restricted by these circumstances.

Instead of trying to find (or worse, assume a priori) an ironclad correlation between political parties and economic or social interests, one can observe that by definition politicians are human beings, and that like any other people they are rational actors—that is, they act using means to achieve

32 Azevedo Amaral. O Estado Autoritário e a Realidade Nacional.
33 Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco. História e Teoria do Partido Político no Direito Constitucional Brasileiro.
34 Carvalho, 2014, p. 43.
subjectively valued ends. That is not to say they have perfect information or that they never experience regret, but rather that sometimes a politician will try to favor group A, sometimes group B, but will always try to favor himself. Considering this “praxeological” approach, we can say that politicians are a group not reducible to other groups in society. Although they do interact in many ways with other groups, they seek first their own interests.

A Rereading of Early Brazilian Political History

Using the theoretical framework mentioned briefly above, we can make a more accurate assessment of the political parties in monarchical Brazil. Much like John Adams in the Federalist Party, some theorists of the Conservative Party, such as Paulino Soares de Sousa, first viscount of Uruguay, expressed fear of mob rule as a justification for a stronger government; in some cases, actions based on this fear led to accusations of despotism. Around the 1840s, Sousa was one of the main leaders of the Conservatives, both ideologically and in practical terms. In his view, the classical liberal concept of liberty was a worthy goal, but the Brazilian people were not ready for the same levels of freedom present in Europe or the United States. This way of thinking is still common among politicians and Brazilians in general. Giving some credit to Sousa, we can say that his intentions might have been good, but he was moving in the wrong direction. By having more government, the country could never have more freedom. Instead of disregarding Sousa’s political thought, it is much wiser to take it with a grain of salt. The fact is, he did not give the people more liberty. It seems that, maliciously or not, he was not personally convinced that the value of freedom in society surpassed other values.


36 For John Adams’s political thought, see C. Bradley Thompson, John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty.


38 Uruguai; Paulino José Soares de Sousa, p. 437.

39 I draw this conclusion from various pieces of evidence: there is no conservative or classical liberal party in Brazil today; Brazil has had a socialist party in power for almost fifteen years; the economy is considered less than free by several different international agencies. This list could go on.
We can contrast Paulino Soares de Sousa with Aureliano Cândido Tavares Bastos.⁴⁰ Bastos was affiliated with the Liberal Party, but never held any office higher than general congressman, so in terms of political rank, he was a medium-level player. Despite, or perhaps because of this, he became the greatest defender of classical liberalism in monarchical Brazil, even in Brazil’s entire history.⁴¹ He may not have held high political office, but he wrote extensively. He wrote everything from articles to pamphlets and even books—a rarity in this context⁴²—criticizing many policies of the Conservative Party and defending classical liberal policies such as the abolition of slavery, free trade, freedom of religion, and openness to immigration.⁴³ In contrast with Sousa, Bastos believed the Brazilian people were ready for the same level of liberty found in Europe and especially in the United States,⁴⁴ a country he greatly admired. He resolutely conveyed his belief that a lack of such liberty was inexcusable.⁴⁵

Many historians and political analysts seem to have difficulty understanding Brazil’s nineteenth-century political landscape because they fall victim to thinking along a single-axis political spectrum, with revolutionaries on the left and conservatives on the right.⁴⁶ In doing so, they reproduce nineteenth-century supposed common sense. When these historians analyze the main leaders of both parties—for example, members of the Council of State, who were politicians at the peaks of their careers⁴⁷—they tend to conclude that the parties were simply two different oligarchies, with few

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⁴⁰ For an exposition of the debate between Sousa and Bastos, see Gabriela Nunes Ferreira, *Centralização e descentralização no Império: o debate entre Tavares Bastos e visconde do Uruguai*.


⁴² Political discussion in monarchical Brazil was mostly done in public speeches, pamphlets, and newspapers. Books were not unheard of, but were rare. Carlos Rizzini, *O Livro, o Jornal e a Tipografia no Brasil*; Nelson Werneck Sodré, *História da Imprensa no Brasil*.


⁴⁴ Tavares Bastos, p. 411.


⁴⁷ Carvalho, pp. 357-90; Nabuco, p. 107.
meaningful differences.\textsuperscript{48} One way of avoiding this error is to adopt a multi-axis political chart and to regard party labels with a grain of salt: just as in the present day,\textsuperscript{49} there were factions within parties, and both parties had their share of idealists, realists, and even hypocrites.

Instead of using a single-axis political spectrum, we would be better off using a multi-axis one, such as the Nolan Chart or the Political Compass.\textsuperscript{50} By doing so, we easily see that the nineteenth-century political spectrum was not composed of two or three possibilities from left to right, but at least four possibilities divided along two axes. Some conclusions thus become obvious: many so-called liberals were actually local oligarchs in the provinces, defending decentralization for their private interests,\textsuperscript{51} not for the sake of lessening central power in an unbiased, Jeffersonian way. However, there were other Liberals, such as the already-mentioned Tavares Bastos, who were actually defenders of classical liberalism. In a similar way, many so-called conservatives were simply defending the status quo against necessary reforms (if individual liberty was actually a goal\textsuperscript{52}). Even though they publicly praised the values of individual liberty, they never truly considered the abolition of slavery and the employment of free Africans. Other Conservatives were genuinely afraid of harsh changes such as those carried out during the French Revolution.\textsuperscript{53} Paulino Soares de Sousa, for example, was born in Paris, and

\textsuperscript{48} Carvalho, p. 360.

\textsuperscript{49} For a contemporary discussion on this subject see Alan Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems.

\textsuperscript{50} For a discussion, see William S. Maddox; Stuart A Lilic, Beyond Liberal and Conservative: Reassessing the Political Spectrum; and Roger E. Bissell, “The Logic of Liberty: Aristotle, Ayn Rand, and the Logical Structure of the Political Spectrum.”

\textsuperscript{51} Here I am thinking mostly of the founders of the Republican Party in São Paulo. Although understood as even more radical than the liberals, they actually defended their economic interests, not specific ideologies. This was noticed by Boehrer, but can also be seen in the political writings of the Sales brothers, two of the main leaders of the party. Alberto Sales, Política Republicana; Manuel Ferraz de Campos Sales, Da Propaganda à Presidência.

\textsuperscript{52} An example of this is José Paranhos’s (Viscount of Rio Branco) postponement of abolition. See Joaquim Nabuco, Um estadista do Império: Nabuco de Araújo: sua vida, suas opiniões, sua época, tomo 3, p. 46. His attitude can be contrasted with that of Nabuco de Araújo, a Liberal leader: Joaquim Nabuco, Um estadista do Império: Nabuco de Araújo: sua vida, suas opiniões, sua época, tomo 3, pp. 175-76.

\textsuperscript{53} Paulino Soares de Sousa had family connections to France, and his childhood was marked by the revolution. José Murilo Carvalho, Paulino José Soares de Souza, Visconde do Uruguai, p. 13.
his mother’s family suffered through the Revolution. These Conservatives wanted progress within order, much like Edmund Burke.  

It is not always possible or easy to differentiate between the libertarian, the oligarch, the conservative, and the statist, especially when talking about historical figures who lived over a century and a half ago. Nevertheless, getting rid of the conventional, single-axis political spectrum is necessary.

Another possibility is to use a different single-axis political spectrum. In the conventional single-axis political spectrum, radicals are placed on the left, moderates in the center, and reactionaries on the right. This usage stems from the French Revolution, in which Jacobins were placed on the left and Girondists on the right. This is bad enough if we consider that in contemporary usage of this spectrum socialists and modern liberals are placed on the left and conservatives and fascists on the right. For most of the nineteenth century, Brazilian politics had no possibility of accommodating socialists because socialists did not yet exist (not in their modern incarnation, anyway). Marx’s manifesto was published only in 1848, and news about the idea of communism did not really arrive in Brazil until much later. However, if we were to put socialists on the usual political spectrum, where would they belong? On the left, with the radical liberals? This makes little sense. No two political ideologies are more opposed than socialism and classical liberalism. It makes even less sense than placing fascism on the extreme right, when it shares much more with communism than with conservatism. Some might try to compensate by saying that the extreme

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54 Besides the already-mentioned Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke’s political thought can also be found in Burke, A Vindication of Natural Society: A View of the Miseries and Evils Arising to Mankind.

55 What I present next is a political spectrum that I believe can be deduced from the work of Friedrich Hayek, especially The Road to Serfdom.


57 Although I believe this is common sense, one example can be found in Roger Griffin, Fascism, pp. 8, 307.

58 It is possible to identify a protosocialism in Euclides da Cunha, Silvio Romero, and Alberto Torres, although socialism itself was yet to come. See Alberto Torres, O Problema Nacional Brasileiro; Silvio Romero, Realidades e Ilusões no Brasil; Euclides da Cunha. Contrastes e Confrontos. The Brazilian Communist Party was founded in 1922.

59 This is one of Hayek’s main theses. See Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom.
right and extreme left are close to one another like the ends of a horseshoe, but this is view still misleading and, more importantly, unnecessary.

A better single-axis political spectrum maps the concentration of power in the state and individual liberty from left to right: on the extreme left there is a maximum of state power; on the extreme right, no state power at all. One great advantage of this political spectrum is that it transcends time. Whether we call it despotism, caesarism, absolutism, totalitarianism, authoritarianism, communism, fascism, Nazism, it does not matter: all are instances of extreme state power. There are nuances and important differences among them, to be sure, but they each advocate the accumulation of maximum power in one entity, such as a person, class, group, or party. On the extreme right there is anarchy, another ideology that transcends time. In the middle there are gradations of power concentrated in the state, or inversely, the liberty of individuals.

Considering the political spectrum proposed above, Brazilian politician, diplomat, and writer Joaquim Nabuco was correct when he observed that the empire was the real republic. Although the monarchy was far from an ideal liberal society, it was closer to liberty than the republic eventually was, much as England today is closer to a liberal democracy than most republics. Many different political realities may hide behind the labels of republic, monarchy, etc. Similarly, different oligarchies can hide behind the labels of Saquarema or Luzia: oligarchies connected to different economic activities, locations, social classes (if we are forced to use this category), and so on. It is not essential to identify which oligarchy is in power; the results are basically the same.

On a complementary note, analysts make a major mistake by speaking about a modernization from above in nineteenth-century Brazil. This was an important view in the Brazilian Conservative Party that has adopted by

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60 For probably the earliest use of this analogy, see Jean-Pierre Faye, *Le Siècle des idéologies.*

61 I am well aware of the differences among the systems mentioned, and I do not mean to imply they are not important. My point is that at this point of my argument it is more important to differentiate between conditions of maximum and minimum state power.

62 In 1896 Nabuco published an article in the newspaper *O Comércio de São Paulo* with the slogan “a monarquia é que era a república.”

63 Once again I turn to Joaquim Nabuco and his liberal disillusion with the republic.

64 This theme appears in Carvalho and is inspired by Barrington Moore Jr. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World.*
modern scholars.\textsuperscript{65} The core of the party was composed of civil servants, initially trained in the University of Coimbra in late nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{66} Later generations of the Brazilian Conservative Party received similar training in the law schools of Brazil.\textsuperscript{65} In their view, Brazil was an unenlightened country compared to England and other parts of Europe. It was then the goal of the state to modernize Brazil.\textsuperscript{68} This view has many similarities with Portuguese absolutism and mercantilism.\textsuperscript{69} It was also completely reckless. If by modernization we mean the move from a traditional society to a liberal one,\textsuperscript{70} this is something that, by definition, cannot be done by a large state. After all, a liberal society has a small state. To accept the Saquarema plan as valid shows a lack of understanding of economics and politics. A big, mercantilist state will not produce a small, liberal one. Saquarema bureaucracy (or any bureaucracy, for that matter) is also likely to simply become another oligarchy, and a very powerful one at that.

Here we can point out a distinction between bureaucracy and government: bureaucracy is composed of civil servants whose job is to staff government executive agencies or support elected officials. This is certainly true in Weber’s ideal model of rational bureaucracy,\textsuperscript{71} but it is clearly not the case when talking about nineteenth-century Brazil. In that context, following the Conservative centralized model inherited from Portugal, government and bureaucracy were too entangled for the distinction to make sense.\textsuperscript{72} The bureaucracy could have used money from slave owners to jumpstart itself, but once in place, it would have had a much stronger accessory: power.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{65} This is another criticism of Carvalho.
\textsuperscript{66} Carvalho, p. 285.
\textsuperscript{67} Carvalho, pp. 63-92.
\textsuperscript{69} For a study of Portuguese absolutism and mercantilism see Kenneth Maxwell, Pomonal, Paradox of the Enlightenment.
\textsuperscript{70} Here I am thinking mainly of Max Weber’s concepts of traditional and rational.
\textsuperscript{71} Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Graham T. Allison’s model of bureaucratic politics is also of interest here. See “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications.”
\textsuperscript{72} Carvalho, pp. 143-68.
\textsuperscript{73} For a classic study on bureaucracy and how it can become an interest group in its own right, see Milovan Dílas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System. See also Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy, for an Austrian (and critical) perspective on bureaucracy.
The Brazil That Could Have Been

If the Conservatives in Brazil were actually concerned with mob rule in a Burkean sense, and therefore in prioritizing a strong state over liberty, they were sleeping with the enemy. As Lord Acton put it, “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority; still more when you superadd the tendency of the certainty of corruption by authority.”

When Brazil was ruled by the absolutist and mercantilist Portuguese monarchy, Joaquim José da Silva Xavier, also known as Tiradentes, was murdered because he refused to satisfy the Portuguese mercantilists’ appetite for gold. The phrase “no taxation without representation” would have served him just as it did the American revolutionaries. When independence from Portugal was achieved and a Brazilian state established, Frei Caneca was murder because he took part in the Pernambucan Revolt of 1817 and the Confederation of the Equator in 1824. He refused to accept the arbitrarily imposed government of Rio de Janeiro.

There were many revolts against the central power exercised by Rio de Janeiro during the 1830s, and at least two of them were in answer to the Conservatives’ rise to power in 1837. The Sabinada (1837-38), for example, was a revolt by military officer Francisco Sabino that occurred in Bahia between November 6, 1837, and March 16, 1838. Another was Balaiada, a social revolt between 1838 and 1841 in the interior of the province of Maranhão. These and other revolts cannot be automatically linked to the (supposedly) weak government of Diogo Antônio Feijó, as Conservative historiography usually does. Even if there were such a link, a truly liberal government should have mechanisms of peaceful secession.

The Liberal rebellions of 1842 and the Praieira revolt of 1848 were the swan song of the truly liberal project contained in Brazil’s independence, and which buried by the authoritarian project of the Conservatives. Although José Murilo de Carvalho praises the Brazilian elite for its civil (and not military)

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75 Kenneth Maxwell, A Devassa da Devassa.  
character (in contrast with the Spanish American elites),\textsuperscript{78} the truth is that Conservatives were happy to use the military (exemplified in the famous Luis Alves de Lima e Silva, Duke of Caxias, the only person made duke during Pedro II’s reign) to do the dirty work.\textsuperscript{79}

Moving from internal to foreign policy, it would be interesting to examine whether at least some of the wars fought by Brazil in the nineteenth century were diversionary, that is, whether the government found external enemies to divert attention from its own evils and to create the illusion of national unity.\textsuperscript{80} The Cisplatine War (1825-28) and the Platine War (1851-52) seem to contain the elements of such wars. Whether they were diversionary or not, however, one thing is certain: following the pattern predicted by Robert Higgs in \textit{Crisis and Leviathan},\textsuperscript{81} wars led to the growth of the Brazilian government.\textsuperscript{82}

The Conservative project failed to address individual liberty. An important example was the excessive length of time slavery lasted in Brazil. By the time Brazil abolished slavery in 1888, it was the last country in the Western world to do so. An estimated four million slaves had been imported from Africa to Brazil, 40 percent of the total brought to the Americas. This is ten times as many as were trafficked to North America and far more than the total number of Africans who were transported to all of the Caribbean and North America combined.\textsuperscript{83} According to the only national census accomplished during the monarchy, in 1872, Brazil had a population of about 10 million people. Of this, slaves comprised 15.24%, while 84.8% were free. It is likely this census does not reflect the reality of the whole monarchical period, as immigration, successive laws against slavery, and other factors changed these proportions over time. Yet it is clear that Brazil always had a free population that did not own any slaves. The Conservative group, however, had little to no concern for this free population.

\textsuperscript{78} Carvalho, pp. 236, 274.

\textsuperscript{79} Here I am thinking about revolts suppressed with military power, but another theme that comes to mind is the perception by the military itself that it was left aside. This perception grew after the Paraguayan War (1864-70) and became known as the Military Question. John Schulz, \textit{O Exército na política: origens da intervenção militar, 1850-1894}.

\textsuperscript{80} For an introductory study of diversionary wars see Karl Derouen, “Presidents and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Research Note.”

\textsuperscript{81} Robert Higgs, \textit{Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government}.

\textsuperscript{82} Carvalho, p. 264.

\textsuperscript{83} For a study of Brazilian slavery see Hebe Mattos, \textit{Das Cores do Silêncio}.
José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, a major figure in the early Conservative movement, praised freedom in his writings, but kept slavery in place, even after English pressure to abolish it and the promise of aid to do so. His motivation was simple: he depended on the slave owners’ money, was afraid of slave revolts, and thought abolition was not politically wise. Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos, founder of the actual Conservative Party, was a slave owner and even rented his slaves out for public works. Many subsequent leaders of the Conservative Party, such as Paulino José Soares de Sousa, were part of the Fluminense slave owner aristocracy, either by birth or by marriage. Regardless, the Conservative Party was not in a hurry to abolish slavery. The resulting lack of revenue and the political implications were matters of much greater concern than the humanitarian cause. When they finally passed gradual abolition laws (and ironically they passed them all) it was to appease the Liberal opposition, not for the sake of principle.

To sum up, Conservative interest was joined with that of the slave owners in the Rio de Janeiro-Minas Gerais-São Paulo belt. Slave owners could provide great sums of money for their statist project, and Conservatives also feared slave revolts such as the one in Haiti. This fear, however, proved to be unfounded, as the abolition process was followed by little or no revolt.

Conservatives were also unwilling to employ the Africans as free workers (something never mentioned in their writings) or to treat immigrants as free individuals. Their plan was to gradually abolish slavery and to substitute for it a cheap immigrant labor force. This was to be done through the Lei de Terras of 1850. The aim of the law was to restrict access to land, something that would force immigrants to work on large estates before being granted access to property ownership. To the surprise of Conservatives, this plan never succeeded. Their last effort, to employ supposedly naïve Chinese

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84 José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, p. 204.
85 José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, p. 200.
86 José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, pp. 33, 172, 209.
Carvalho, pp. 19, 42.
87 Ronaldo Vainfas, ed. Dicionário do Brasil Imperial, p. 92.
88 José Murilo Carvalho, Paulino José Soares de Souza, Visconde do Uruguai, p. 14.
89 Carvalho p. 18.
90 Carvalho, pp. 59, 224, 234.
91 Carvalho. p. 378.
92 Carvalho p. 18.
93 Vainfas, pp. 466-68; Carvalho, pp. 329-54.
workers as a substitute for slaves, was barred by the Liberals. This is why I say the Conservatives were unwilling to treat immigrants as free individuals: the laws created by them dealt with immigrants as tools, not human beings. Immigration did eventually occur in Brazil toward the end of the century, but only despite Conservative policy, not because of it.

One legacy of slavery is that yesterday’s country of slavery is today’s country of socialism. As Herbert Spencer once argued:

All socialism involves slavery. That which fundamentally distinguishes the slave is that he labours under coercion to satisfy another’s desires… [I]f, without option, he has to labour for the society, and receives from the general stock such portion as the society awards him, he becomes a slave to the society. Socialistic arrangements necessitate an enslavement of this kind; and towards such an enslavement many recent measures, and still more the measures advocated, are carrying us.

Even simpler, Alexis de Tocqueville claimed that “socialism is a new form of slavery.” None of that is to say that the politicians of the Liberal Party were bleeding-heart abolitionists, but some were, especially the more ideological ones. Joaquim Nabuco and Tavares Bastos are good examples. I am also not arguing that all Liberals had a truly republican, or at least parliamentarian, project for Brazil in mind. But some did. Joaquim Gonçalves Ledo, for example, José Bonifácio’s greatest political adversary, said the following: “In nature, satellites are never larger than their planets. America must belong to America, Europe to Europe, because the Great Architect of the Universe didn’t put in between them the immense space that separates them in vain.” This language is very reminiscent of George Washington, including its Masonic tone. It is an especially good example

94 Carvalho developmentalism, pp. 316, 344.
95 Herbert Spencer, The Man versus the State, with Six Essays on Government, Society and Freedom.
96 Notes for a Speech on Socialism (1848), in Alexis de Tocqueville, Ouvres complètes, édition définitive.
97 Joaquim Nabuco was one of the main leaders of the abolitionist movement, and Tavares Bastos, as already mentioned, firmly opposed slavery in his writings.
98 Here I again think of Tavares Bastos and Joaquim Nabuco. Nabuco’s father, Nabuco de Araújo, can also be mentioned.
100 Consider, for example, Washington’s Farewell Address.
101 Both were freemasons.
of the American ideal that was defeated by the European ideal of the Conservatives.

What is the legacy of all this? It should be obvious enough that bureaucracy is an elite and that it has the inclination to become an oligarchy in its own right.\textsuperscript{102} In this case, even the classical notion of republican virtue has to be taken with caution\textsuperscript{103}—the caution of checks and balances and a healthy suspicion of government.\textsuperscript{104}

There is an anecdote I believe can help illustrate what I have described so far, supposedly taken from a psychological experiment:

They started with a cage containing five monkeys. Inside the cage, they hung a banana on a string with a set of stairs placed under it. Before long, a monkey went to the stairs and started to climb towards the banana. As soon as he started up the stairs, the psychologists sprayed all of the other monkeys with ice cold water. After a while, another monkey made an attempt to obtain the banana. As soon as his foot touched the stairs, all of the other monkeys were sprayed with ice cold water. It’s [sic] was not long before all of the other monkeys would physically prevent any monkey from climbing the stairs. Now, the psychologists shut off the cold water, removed one monkey from the cage and replaced it with a new one. The new monkey saw the banana and started to climb the stairs. To his surprise and horror, all of the other monkeys attacked him. After another attempt and attack, he discovered that if he tried to climb the stairs, he would be assaulted. Next they removed another of the original five monkeys and replaced it with a new one. The newcomer went to the stairs and was attacked. The previous newcomer took part in the punishment with enthusiasm! Likewise, they replaced a third original monkey with a new one, then a fourth, then the fifth. Every time the newest monkey tried to climb the stairs, he was attacked. The monkeys had no idea why they were not permitted to climb the stairs or why they were beating any monkey that tried. After replacing all the original monkeys, none of the remaining monkeys had ever been sprayed with cold water. Nevertheless, no monkey ever again approached the stairs to try for

\textsuperscript{102} Milovan Đilas, \textit{The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System.}

\textsuperscript{103} The best examples of this kind of republicanism are Aristotle, Plato, and Cicero. See Allan Bloom, \textit{Plato’s Republic}, and Aristotle, \textit{Politics}.

\textsuperscript{104} This is, I believe, a good way of summarizing the distinction between classical republicanism and liberal republicanism: liberal republicanism does not rely solely on the virtue of the legislators.
the banana. Why not? Because as far as they know that’s the way it’s always been around here.105

The account is apocryphal, but it circulates among libertarians as an illustration of the idea that through gradual change society becomes used to abusive government. I believe it is a good illustration of the Brazilian political history outlined here as well. José Murilo de Carvalho is wrong to call liberals idealists,106 but he is right to compare politics to theater.107 As President Ronald Reagan supposedly said, “I don’t know how anybody can serve in public office without being an actor.”108 Deep down, politics is mainly a dispute over power, but on the surface appearances are really important.109

In conclusion, it is wrong to force Brazilian politics in the nineteenth century onto the conventional left-right political spectrum—as is often done—for the same reason it is always wrong: it is not left vs. right that matters; it is the state vs. the people. Or to quote George Orwell, “The real division is not between conservatives and revolutionaries but between authoritarians and libertarians.”110

References


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106 Carvalho, p. 367.

107 Carvalho, p. 420.

108 I cannot seem to find a really good source for this quote, but it seems to me that it already entered public discourse. Canonical or not, I believe it tells a lot about politics and I apologize for the colloquial language.

109 Here I think mostly of The Prince, by Niccolò Machiavelli: “The vulgar crowd always is taken by appearances, and the world consists chiefly of the vulgar.”

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