Abstract: In this article we reply to George Selgin’s counterarguments to our article “Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles”. Selgin regards holding cash as saving while we focus on the real savings necessary to maintain investment projects. Real savings are unconsumed real income. Variations in real savings are not necessarily equal to variations in cash holdings. We show that a coordinated credit expansion in a fractional reserve free banking (FRFB) system is possible and that precautionary reserves consequently do not pose a necessary limit. We discuss various instances in which a FRFB system may expand credit without a prior increase in real savings. These facets all demonstrate why a fractional reserve banking system – even a free banking one – is inherently unstable, and incentivized to impose a stabilizing central bank. We find that at the root of our disagreements with Selgin lies a different approach to monetary theory. Selgin subscribes to the aggregative equation of exchange, which impedes him from seeing the microeconomic problems that the stabilization of “MV” by a FRFB system causes.

Abstract: Frequency probability theorists define an event’s probability distribution as the limit of a repeated set of trials belonging to a homogeneous collective. The subsets of this collective are events which we have deficient knowledge about on an individual level, although for the larger collective we have knowledge its aggregate behavior. Hence, probabilities can only be achieved through repeated trials of these subsets arriving at the established frequencies that define the probabilities. Crovelli (2009) argues that this is a mistaken approach, and that a subjective assessment of individual trials should be used instead. Bifurcating between the two concepts of risk and uncertainty, Crovelli first asserts that probability is the tool used to manage uncertain situations, and then attempts to rebuild a definition of probability theory with this in mind. We show that such an attempt has little to gain, and results in an indeterminate application of entrepreneurial forecasting to uncertain decisions—a process far-removed from any application of probability theory.