6. “Response to Block on Abortion, Round Three”
by Jakub Bożydar Wiśniewski 
Abstract: Block (2011) has offered a second round of counterarguments to my criticisms (Wisniewski 2010a, 2010b) of the claim that his theory of evictionism is compatible with libertarianism. In this paper I attempt to demonstrate that my critique still stands. In particular, I focus on analyzing the argumentative weight of such issues mentioned in Block’s latest response as, among others, the distinction between proper ex post punishment and proper ex ante defense, the question of whether my causal analyses of trespass imply a commitment to positive obligations, Rothbard’s distinction between contracts and premises, the supposed irrelevance of the principle of pacta sunt servanda in the context of abortion, and the extent to which custom can qualify the ambit of applicability of the non-aggression principle.
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I’m quite confounded by certain aspects of this discussion. It frequently seems you two are talking past each other and not quite getting to the root of the issue.
Wiśniewski is arguing that the mother and her fetus have an implicit contract. The question I’m dying to hear is, “What, exactly, are the terms of that contract?”— and this may be my cynicism talking, but I suspect the answer would be, “These terms, which I have decided are most equitable and appropriate for all such situations.”
Then would come the analogies to set up a good strong appeal to emotion.
Wiśniewski’s approach reminds me of a characterization of supporters of social planning: it seems he crafts his theory as a poor disguise for his desire to see the end of the practice of abortion, and doesn’t consider that other instantiations of his theory will necessarily differ from his ideal, very probably in ways he didn’t intend and wouldn’t accept.
Consider: the terms of our implicit contract do need to be worked out. Suppose some other person worked out the terms, and they differed significantly from Wiśniewski’s. What then?
What if someone else gets to implement the details, and Wiśniewski isn’t at all happy with how it turns out?
I also feel this will necessarily lead to a debate about the proper size of government, as Block is an anarchocapitalist, and Wiśniewski’s theory would seem to require a central body making the rules to some degree (can’t prohibit something if no-one has the power to enforce it), and likely a public prosecutor.
On the other side of this debate, I will mention two frustrations I have when reading Block: first, he really seems to be asking for it with his repetition of “gentlest manner possible,” “gentlest manner possible.” What really struck me after reading that enough times is that there is already a means of getting a fetus out of his mother while at the same time allowing him a fairly good chance to survive- carrying him to term. That strikes me as pretty gentle, and I think approaching it from that direction would give him another good perspective.
As for the second (and minor) point with Block, his latest article in this exchange laid clear that he considers his approach to be different from the pro-choice position, and that surprised me, as I’d taken him for a pro-choice guy while following this conversation. The distinction strikes me as artificial.
In any case, keep it up, guys. This series is quite stimulating.
This might be a repeat…my apologies if it is. Tom
I think Wiśniewski’s “mystery force” analogy fails on a couple of counts. First it does not address the source, or ownership of this force. Is it a tool used by Y to trap trespassers? Or is it “owned” by a third party, Z? Secondly it does not take into account the sustainment of Y during Y’s nine month stasis. Who or what is responsible for the care, feeding, and shelter of Y during this time? It seems to me that the relevance of the analogy rests on these answers.
I guess I don’t understand how Wiśniewski can fail to see the positive obligations his position imposes on the property owner (Y in his analogy; a woman and her womb in a pregnancy) and / or how those obligations are counter to libertarian philosophy and the NAP. But I look forward to any further discussion / rejoinders on the subject.