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	<title>Comments on: 19. &#8220;Action-Based Jurisprudence: Praxeological Legal Theory in Relation to Economic Theory, Ethics, and Legal Practice&#8221;</title>
	<atom:link href="http://libertarianpapers.org/2011/19-graf-action-based-jurisprudence-praxeological/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://libertarianpapers.org/2011/19-graf-action-based-jurisprudence-praxeological/</link>
	<description>A Journal of Libertarian Scholarship</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 24 Apr 2013 18:59:49 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>By: Konrad Graf</title>
		<link>http://libertarianpapers.org/2011/19-graf-action-based-jurisprudence-praxeological/comment-page-1/#comment-6735</link>
		<dc:creator>Konrad Graf</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Aug 2011 08:44:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://libertarianpapers.org/?p=1818#comment-6735</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Thanks. On your last comment, I am guessing this might concern the idea that actions necessarily involve the use of physical matter (&quot;what is seen&quot;), as contrasted with counterfactual non-actions, which do not (&quot;what is not seen&quot;). I agree that acting to remain motionless is also an action. Interestingly, it is still matter that is being kept motionless, so the action of remaining motionless also entails the use of matter.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks. On your last comment, I am guessing this might concern the idea that actions necessarily involve the use of physical matter (&#8220;what is seen&#8221;), as contrasted with counterfactual non-actions, which do not (&#8220;what is not seen&#8221;). I agree that acting to remain motionless is also an action. Interestingly, it is still matter that is being kept motionless, so the action of remaining motionless also entails the use of matter.</p>
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		<title>By: Kris</title>
		<link>http://libertarianpapers.org/2011/19-graf-action-based-jurisprudence-praxeological/comment-page-1/#comment-6729</link>
		<dc:creator>Kris</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Aug 2011 20:48:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://libertarianpapers.org/?p=1818#comment-6729</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Nice paper. I thought that this was the most interesting paragraph:

&quot;In claiming that the is/ought gap has been “transcended” in Rothbard’s words, there remains a risk of overstatement, to assuming that an “ought” has actually been derived from an “is.” While it may nearly appear that it has, this is not claimed. What has been done, in my view, is subtler. Praxeology has delimited a sphere of possibility for the category of justification with regard to property norms. With no recourse to “oughts,” praxeology arrives at a somewhat surprising conclusion: there is only one set of norms at the level of property theory that are compatible with the requirements of justification itself—and these are the NAP-based norms.&quot;


On a separate note, choosing to remain motionless is an action.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nice paper. I thought that this was the most interesting paragraph:</p>
<p>&#8220;In claiming that the is/ought gap has been “transcended” in Rothbard’s words, there remains a risk of overstatement, to assuming that an “ought” has actually been derived from an “is.” While it may nearly appear that it has, this is not claimed. What has been done, in my view, is subtler. Praxeology has delimited a sphere of possibility for the category of justification with regard to property norms. With no recourse to “oughts,” praxeology arrives at a somewhat surprising conclusion: there is only one set of norms at the level of property theory that are compatible with the requirements of justification itself—and these are the NAP-based norms.&#8221;</p>
<p>On a separate note, choosing to remain motionless is an action.</p>
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		<title>By: MichaelC</title>
		<link>http://libertarianpapers.org/2011/19-graf-action-based-jurisprudence-praxeological/comment-page-1/#comment-6728</link>
		<dc:creator>MichaelC</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Aug 2011 12:08:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://libertarianpapers.org/?p=1818#comment-6728</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This is brilliant.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is brilliant.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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