37. “Minarchy Considered”
by Richard A Garner
Abstract: Whilst some defenders of the minimal, limited state or government hold that the state is “a necessary evil,” others would consider that this claim that the state is evil concedes too much ground to anarchists. In this article I intend to discuss the views of some who believe that government is a good thing, and their arguments for supporting this position. My main conclusions will be that, in each case, the proponents of a minimal state, or “minarchy,” fail to justify as much as what they call government, and so fail to oppose anarchism, or absences of what they call government.
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[...] 2009 Goto comments Leave a comment Libertarian Papers vol. 1 (2009), Art. No. 37: “Minarchy Considered,” by Richard A Garner. This paper, a thorough and withering analysis of defects [...]
[...] Papers vol. 1 (2009), Art. No. 37: “Minarchy Considered,” by Richard A Garner. This paper, a thorough and withering analysis of defects of minarchist [...]
Mr. Garner:
Being a libertarian of the “no state” variety (http://libertarianpapers.org/articles/2009/lp-1-32.pdf), I heartily commend you for your very thorough examination of the issue and your conclusion that “the minimal state must also be unjustified.” Indeed it must. And until libertarians unite in this regard — i.e., until they reject Mises’ claim that the preservation of society “justifies the action of the organs of the state” — its advocates will never have to defend the existence of the state per se. For if society cannot exist without the state, then the case regarding the state’s existence is effectively closed, never mind that its “necessary evil” renders human morality null and void. All the better, in fact, since this leaves the state as the sole determinant, not of what people should or should not do but of what they can or cannot do. As the supreme arbiter of human action, the state does not act in accordance with moral precepts; it merely does what it wants as it dictates what others must do, morality be damned.
Where I would differ with you is semantically, which is to say, in your identification of no-state libertarians as “anarchists.” True, if anarchy is defined simply as “no state,” then such libertarians are anarchists. But given the actual dictionary definition of the word — i.e., “a state of society without government or law,” “a state of lawlessness and political disorder,” “absence of order,” “confusion; chaos; disorder,” etc. — I seriously doubt that those who don’t believe that the state is necessary or justified would describe themselves as anarchists, especially since the public generally accepts the dictionary definition of the word. After all, was the aftermath of hurricane Katrina not uniformly described in the press as anarchy? And was “a state of lawlessness” and an “absence of order” not what characterized it?
But no-state — i.e., true — libertarians believe not in lawlessness and disorder but in law that is held in common by the members of society and in order that arises spontaneously from its application. And it is a disservice to the cause of liberty, then, to identify true libertarians with that which the general public rightly fears. So away with term — away with “market anarchists, individualist anarchists, libertarian anarchists, or anarcho-capitalists” — and let true libertarianism be understood as law-and-order libertarianism, wherein statism is understood as the perversion thereof — i.e., as the positivism of law and the regimentation of order that are inimical to the social enterprise and thus to humanity as a whole.
Thank you DG White for your favourable comments. I understand the consternation the term “anarchist” raises, but I would endorse an etymological definition, “an-archy – without rulers” or Benjamin Tucker’s definition, “the doctrine that all the affairs of men should be managed by individuals or voluntary associations, and that the State should be abolished.” I would also point out that anarchy is the condition of society without a state, that is without an institution with a monopoly on authorising legal or legitimate force, not necessarily a society that lacks objective and common rules to establish when force is used legally or legitimately.
The problem, as I see it — and not to take anything away from your otherwise very fine and important paper — is that identifying no-state libertarianism with anarchy is counterproductive in that the etymological definition no more applies to anarchy today than “wireless” applies to radio or “gay” applies to happy. Yes, radios are wireless, and gays can be happy, but do your turn on the “wireless” in your car? When you feel good, do you tell others that you are “gay”? Of course you don’t. So why would a no-state libertarian refer to himself as “an anarchist” when, in common parlance, anarchy is identified with “lawlessness” and the “absence of order”?
It’s hard enough getting the libertarian message across. So why make it that much more difficult by using terminology that is all but guaranteed to scare people away?
This is a hot-topic in libertarian circles, and I advise ‘voluntaryist’ It’s soft, it sounds like something the people already understand, but it requires some explanation. Further, it lends itself to easy explanation: of course we want laws and security, but want to give people the right to voluntarily choose their associates, replacing taxation with service bills.
Using “anarchy” could still be strategic, after people have an idea of your stance it could be used to illustrate that Statist propaganda is so pervasive that they associate anarchy with chaos and State law with order, when the reality is that violence is chaos and peace is order – only where the law breeds peace does order truly ensue.
Be careful with using the “voluntaryist” label, as its not simply a synonym for anarcho-capitalist or market anarchist. It is a more specific philosophy that outright rejects all electoral politics. And as we already know many anarcho-capitalists (one very famous one) are fine with voting.
Be careful defining terms as other people apply them to themselves.
I understand why some self-ID’d ‘voluntaryists’ reject voting, and I don’t personally see any mathematical significance to the act unless it is a very local decision – but I’d bet that all of those ‘anti-voting’ voluntaryists would accept that individuals are free to choose how much interaction with the pirates to undertake to meet their own ends, as long as they are not themselves initiating force or causing the pirates to institute more.
And we’re back to where we started with “anarchy”: some people want it to mean one very specific thing, but a general acceptance of the term has taken on a negative meaning.
Which is the systemic problem of collectivism, labeling groups based on heterogeneous characteristics and pigeon-holing all the many shades of gray in the world into a binary “we vs. them”.
Perhaps you’d be happier with “sovereign individual” – but that could be interpreted as being belligerent, uncooperative, and antisocial – which again isn’t the connotation that’s being sought.
Let’s agree on at least one thing: at least we aren’t Minarchists.
[...] Papers vol. 1 (2009), Art. No. 37: “Minarchy Considered,” by Richard A Garner. This paper, a thorough and withering analysis of defects of minarchist [...]
It is very good to finally read a critique of Objectivist politics from someone who actually understands it.
I share many of the author’s opinions, particularly with regard to the necessity and morality of preventively supressing organizations capable of using force – absent any intent of using it to violate individual rights.
I retain the firm position that a free country must have clear and objective laws, and that these laws must be known. Also, there must be an ultimate instance of appeal.
Whether an established and formal organization or a de facto arrangement of formally separate entities (all enforcing a proper, consistent set of laws – with processes in place to change them and adjudicate inter agency disputes), a functioning free country will have a government.
In the second case, if the inter agency structure breaks down, there ceases to be a de facto government. And there ceases to be peace.
Personally I find it much more likely that the first scenario will be established and gradually develop in the direction of the second than the typical anarchist’s dream of simply abolishing government and having the second arrangement spontaneously appear, function and be stable.
“Also, there must be an ultimate instance of appeal.”
I never understand why Objectivists insist on a “final” decision. This fixation is bizarre to me. How does “finality” guarantee justice? And doesn’t this require one-world government?
Here’s a wild guess, with no offense intended to anyone: Perhaps people who aren’t predisposed to fixate on a requirement for finality in decisions are more likely to start considering alternative philosophies, and thus more likely to eventually leave Objectivism.
It would be interesting to hear from Objectivists on whether they think there’s any truth to this; I certainly can’t attest to it one way or another myself, never having been one.
Pedro,
You suggest that even when there is only “a de facto arrangement of formally separate entities (all enforcing a proper, consistent set of laws – with processes in place to change them and adjudicate inter agency disputes), a functioning free country will have a government.” Do you mean that the entire network is a government, or that one of these agencies is? Either way, it is not what Rand, Machan, Kelley, Hospers and Nozick call a government, or state, and would appear to be what market anarchists have advocated.
typos
p.9 “a) Physical force ought to be kept (from?) human relationships.”
p.47″Thus the minimal state differs from the utraminimal state…”
p.47(again) “Secondly, Nozick also distinguishes between the minimal state and the
utraminimal state…”
objectivists will just love the hague!
Commendable, thorough effort.
Although I agree with a number of your positions, I can’t help but feel that the overall argument was one of semantics.
The problem seems to be that, if we anarchists are only interested in saying that people ought to be free to do what the government is allowed by minarchists to do – that is, to use force to stop aggression – then we’ve already won. We are free to do so – and to face the consequences of taking on a much larger security firm. If it is true that, once competition is introduced, then the government is not a government, but just another one of these firms, then the government is not a government now. It is just the largest, by several orders of magnitude, of these security providers, and has stepped outside the bounds of what a security provider is supposed to do. The anarchist answer is that, in this case, the other firms have to get to work protecting people from it. We can make no other objection; surely it is not part of For a New Liberty to appeal to the higher motives of the aggressor agency and ask it nicely to stop. So what are we getting so worked up about?
More to the point, why do libertarians get angry about the actions of policemen, if these are just the employees of rogue agencies? Why did the LP of Nevada put out a press release condemning their own chair for having the audacity to run from agents of the state, who wanted nothing more than to lock him in a cage?
My screen only shows part of this text box, so forgive me if there are mistakes. I think part of the problem when talking about minarchy vs. anarchy and the various other libertarian types of social organization involves what exactly constitutes a “government”. I have never been clear on this at all. As a general principle I think most of us would agree that broader the scope of any government, the less humane and less inclined toward liberty it can and will be, with world government at one extreme and complete individual sovereignty at the other.
Does a group of two or four or eight or ten people agreeing not to interfere with and to defend each other’s individual rights constitute a government? Does any sort of collective with any kind of authority over its members constitute a government? I am not at all clear on this. Isn’t any group of people who choose to cede authority over some aspect of their behavior to any sort of collective group a government?
Suppose, hypothetically, one were to live in a state of anarchy (which I admit, appeals to me on a philosophical and an emotional level) only to find that one of his neighbors has choosen to appropriate a few acres of his property or a few of his cattle. Is one dependent on the goodwill and sense of justice of his other neighbors to support his property rights?
Notwithstanding the fact that every government that has ever existed has served the function of limiting liberty and become oppressive, in my fantasies I have vision of a government who’s sole function is specifically to protect our rights (the libertarian version of “rights”, extending from self ownersip to property rights.) which I think is the only possible legitimate function of a government, but maybe that is a fairy tale that is impossible in principle.
If a social contract is undertaken in which an organization is created to prohibit the intitation of force, how can a second similar insitiution arise?
Whitin the context of raising this insitution, one has already delegated thier right of self-defence to a higher organization. How then, can one then re-delegate this right, no longer possessing it?
In as much, so long as the social contract remians in effect, no legitimate second organization can arise. Therein, no coercion or froce has been intiated by the government in question, and it still maintains it monopoly.