For vols. 1-3 (2009-2011), cite articles as: Author, “Title,” Libertarian Papers [volume #], [article number] (year). Example: Jan Narveson, “Present Payments, Past Wrongs: Correcting Loose Talk about Nozick and Rectification,” Libertarian Papers 1, 1 (2009).
For vol. 4 (2012) onward, cite articles as: Author. Year. "Title." Libertarian Papers. Volume # (issue #): [page numbers]. Example: Michael F. Reber. 2012. "The Role of Work: A Eudaimonistic Perspective." Libertarian Papers. 4 (1): 1-26.
27. “Milton Friedman & the Human Good”
By: Tibor R. Machan
Abstract: Milton Friedman is among those who have favored a value free, amoral defense of the free society. Here I discuss his basic reason for doing so, namely, that the claim to moral knowledge implies authoritarian politics. I argue that this is wrong because to act morally cannot require coercing people to do so–to quote Immanuel Kant, “ought” implies “can.”
![[RSS Feed]](http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/themes/journalist/images/rss.gif "Subscribe to the Libertarian Papers Site Feed")
![[iTunes]](http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/themes/journalist/images/itunes.png "Subscribe to the Libertarian Papers Podcast with iTunes")
![[Mises Institute]](http://mises.org/Community/resized-image.ashx/__size/500x400/__key/CommunityServer.Components.PostAttachments/00.00.08.00.78/80x15.png)
![[CC Attribution 3.0]](http://i.creativecommons.org/l/by/3.0/us/80x15.png)
[...] Libertarian Papers, Vol. 1 (2009), Article No. 27. “Milton Friedman & the Human Good,” by Tibor R. [...]
This article seems like a Jude and Muslim arguing whose god is the “only true god” …
First, the citations provided do not necessarily imply that Friedman’s view is a consequentialist one. Autor argues that if you knew with absolute certainty that what someone is doing is “wrong”, you wouldn’t be morally obliged to prevent him from doing so by virtue of not diminishing his free choice. But i ask, if you see a man about to murder a child, do you consider it morally acceptable to not prevent him doing it if you have the power to stop him? Not using one’s power to stop immoral act is itself immoral.
Off course, this whole argument is useless, because it is itself based on moral assumptions about “right” and “wrong”, ignoring the fact that these are only judgements done by humans, and as such cannot be absolute. Nonetheless, i think Friedman’s claim that if there were absolute moral knowledge it would imply autoritarian politics is correct.
I think Friedman was wise to avoid arguments based on moralistic beliefs precisely for this reason – it takes just different set of moral beliefs for such argument to be invalid. By building his arguments on facts and using purely rational approach, he ensured his argument will remain valid regardless of moral beliefs.
Not allowing another man to sin is a consumable good. In a market anarchy, one would consume it either by offering monetary incentives for people to not sin, or in damages awarded to those you have inconvenienced by preventing them from engaging in the undesired behavior.
I disagree. Offering monetary incentives not to “sin” – by whom? What if someone offers no monetary incentive? This would lead to mafia-like society, where you either pay, or have criminals after you.
Offering damages to people inconvenienced by you preventing them from “sin” would only provide incentive to sin more … in hopes of getting prevented and awarded damages.
[...] established libertarian intellectuals such as Narveson, Higgs, van Dun, Salin, Kukathas, Block, and Machan. And, astoundingly, in our first half year we have published five previously unpublished (or, in [...]