26. “On the Possibility of Assigning Probabilities to Singular Cases, or: Probability Is Subjective Too!”
by Mark R. Crovelli
Abstract: Both Ludwig von Mises and Richard von Mises claimed that numerical probability could not be legitimately applied to singular cases. This paper challenges this aspect of the von Mises brothers’ theory of probability. It is argued that their denial that numerical probability could be applied to singular cases was based solely upon Richard von Mises’ exceptionally restrictive definition of probability. This paper challenges Richard von Mises’ definition of probability by arguing that the definition of probability necessarily depends upon whether the world is governed by time-invariant causal laws. It is argued that if the world is governed by time-invariant causal laws, a subjective definition of probability must be adopted. It is further argued that both the nature of human action and the relative frequency method for calculating numerical probabilities both presuppose that the world is indeed governed by time-invariant causal laws. It is finally argued that the subjective definition of probability undercuts the von Mises claim that numerical probability cannot legitimately be applied to singular, non-replicable cases.
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I enoyed the paper. My best example for showing that probability is in the eye of the beholder is a simple thought experiment: Bob flips a coin and looks at the result, but hides it from Mike. Then both Bob and Mike state the probability of heads. Bob is either going to state 0% or 100% while Mike will state 50%. Thus, probability is subjective, merely a measure of the observer’s ignorance (along with his understanding of the process and the things he does know about it).
I want to point out a third type of universe that you didn’t seem to touch on, which could use more discussion:
A universe that is mostly deterministic with some uncaused random events would be indistinguishable to a human observer from a purely deterministic one, as he wouldn’t be able to tell whether his uncertainty was due to lack of knowledge or an uncaused random process. As long as enough events were deterministic, he would still be able to act productively and form useful models.
When applying the relative frequency method, one simply needs the conditions to vary in typical ways. Whether this variance is due to the complexity of the environment (pseudo-randomness) or true randomness is irrelevant, so the fact that the method would work or be useful is not proof that all events are deterministic, merely that there is sufficient determinism.
In such a universe, an observer’s probability estimate would be based both on his ignorance, and uncaused randomness. If he has complete knowledge, then such a probability would be objective, but if his ignorance was sufficient, it would outweigh the inherent uncaused randomness and make the probability effectively subjective.
So the critical issue is then the amount of uncaused randomness. If it were sufficient enough to be a major factor in probability estimates, then we would surely notice it, unless there were an intelligent being behind the scenes ensuring it occurred only when we weren’t looking. From this, I conclude that if there is uncaused randomness, then it’s only present in areas that we are generally ignorant and thus can’t tell whether the unexpected outcome was due to ignorance or uncaused randomness.
Also, a typographical error: both occurrences of “discreet” on page 14 should be changed to “discrete”.
I can’t agree with the author’s example of the outcome of a boxing match as a singular event to which it makes sense to attach a probability. Suppose A is fighting B tonight, and my bookie gives odds of .61 for A. The author claims that bookie’s are right an astounding portion of the time. My question is – just what counts as my bookie being right or wrong? Would we count him as “right” just in case A wins? If that’s the case, then he could have given any number greater than .5 and he’d be just as right. On the other hand, what if B wins? Why would this mean my bookie is wrong? In sum, just what does the author mean in claiming that there is a numerical probability attached to this fight which can be meaningful?
It seems to me that the natural understanding of my bookie’s odds is to say something like “with a 95% confidence, we believe that if 100 fights just like the one tonight were fought, A would win 61 times.” This is perfectly reasonable, but there’s no way that the one fight that actually takes place can be taken to check such a claim. The claim refers, as Richard von Mises says, to a collective.
Here’s another collective we can put boxing probability into, albeit with a bit more work: form the set of ordered pairs of outcomes and odds. For instance, tonight’s fight (assuming A wins) would be recorded as where the second number is the given probability of winning of whichever combatant is predicted to win, and the first word tells if that combatant wins or loses. Tomorrow, if C wins an upset over D, and the odds of D winning were supposed to be .8, we’ll get . There are plenty of other equivalent ways of defining the ordered pairs to include the same information. Now from this collective, it is possible to calculate the frequency with which the favorite wins, and to mathematically compare it to the probability, giving a confidence interval for this particular bookie’s predictions. Another way of saying that this confidence interval is high, of course, is to say what the author says – that the bookie makes money. So, the fact that the bookie makes money doesn’t establish that he successfully applies probability to singular cases – the very fact that he makes money over time is referring to his performance at guessing many fights, not one.
Professor Katz,
Perhaps I can explain the point here more concretely with an example taken from basketball, since there is an important basketball game tonight. According to the brothers von Mises, it would be absolutely absurd and meaningless to assign a numerical probability to a singular basketball game such as tonight’s game. According to them, we must only calculate numerical probabilities for collectives. But, if I open up any newspaper in America right now, (and I am indeed looking inside my local newspaper), I can find the “line” for the game, which happens to be that Orlando will win tonight’s game by three points. For anyone committed to the von Mises definition of probability, such a number is absolutely ludicrous, but anyone who has ever watched the “lines” for sporting events would be hard-pressed to explain how often such probabilities are accurate.
How could frequentists like the brothers von Mises explain this really obvious empirical reality?
Thanks for your response. First, I must note that I am a high school teacher, not a professor. Now, on basketball – we have a newspaper claiming that Orlando will beat some other team by 3 points. But this certainly is not a probability, just a prediction. What has this to do with probability, other than the separate claim that I can attach a probability to the event of this prediction being correct?
If we want to talk probability, let’s define the experiment and the sample space. It seems to me that there’s two ways to do that. First, we can say that the experiment is simply the difference in scores (say the signed difference Orlando-the other team, so that the sign will show who won.) The sample space, then, is the integers. In this manner, the newspaper is saying that they think the outcome will be three. What they have not done, though, is attached a numerical probability to this outcome. So we’re still in the realm, it seems, that can be covered by verbal description, not in numerical probability.
Another is to say that the experiment is comparing the outcome to the newspaper’s prediction, and the sample space consists of two points – “same” and “different.” Which of these is more likely? I don’t know, but once again, no one is claiming to have a numerical probability.
In neither case have we attached numerical probabilities to any elements in the sample space. However, it may be useful to do so. We can take your local newspaper and ask “what is the probability that they are correct?” This corresponds to the probability of a 3 in the first experiment, or a “same” in the second. Given this question, how would you go about finding the answer?
It seems that you’ve already given the answer above – such reports tend to be correct quite often, and this fact gives you confidence in the number you’re looking at now. In fact, we can even look at how often they’re right and take the limit of the number of times they’re right over position in the sequence, or substitute for “right” falling within some range of the correct answer…but now we’re doing frequentist probability. Barring that, how do you attach a number to the likelihood that the prediction is correct?
Mr. Katz,
I think you’re trying to approach this question from a technical point of view rather than a logical point of view, and I think that is a mistake. What we are after, (or, rather, what my paper is seeking to identify) is an epistemologically defensible definition for probability. In order to accomplish this task, what we need to do is first of all figure out why man tries to attach numerical probabilities to events or phenomena. As I have argued, and Ludwig von Mises argued, man seeks to employ probabilistic methods because he is uncertain about some event or phenomenon. A vital question is thus raised; namely, why is he uncertain? It is because the events and phenomena in the world are themselves completely random and erratic, or simply because man is not omniscient? For Austrians, this leads us to the unavoidable conclusion that man is uncertain for the latter reason– he is not omniscient, even though everything in the world has a prior and certain cause. And this means that probability is simply a subjective measure of man’s uncertainty about the causes in the world.
This seems to me to be the only defensible way to approach this definitional question.
Dr. Crovelli,
I agree with you on these points. In particular, I hold that probability is an epistemic question. In fact, classes I’ve generally argued for a slightly more radical position than yours in that direction – I hold that regardless of whether or not there is real indeterminism in the world (and I think there’s a good case that there might be, both at the quantum level and because chaos and subtle order) probability is still an epistemic question. I didn’t argue with you on those points because I agree with you on them, although I’d go about establishing it somewhat differently. I’m not, for instance, convinced that the fact that causal determinism is logically necessitated by human action implies that the world is causally deterministic, but I do think it implies that we treat it as such, which is good enough for me.
So, yes, man seeks to assign numerical probabilities to various events, classes, and so on, because of this epistemic uncertainty. But this is also the reason that man assigns verbal probabilities to various events. To use the example I heard raised (I wish I could remember who by) a few years back, if the President proposes nationalization of all industry, it makes sense to say things like “Hans Hoppe is more likely to oppose this than is Paul Krugman” or “Hans Hoppe is more likely than not going to oppose this” or something similar – verbal probabilities – but we would not say or understand “there is a probability of .95 that Hans Hoppe will oppose this.” If someone said this, and I was being charitable, I’d rephrase it in my head to mean “Hans Hoppe is very likely to oppose this” and not try to take it literally. I choose this example because, based on your paper, I think you’ll agree that we can’t apply numerical probability to singular events involving human choice of this sort.
Certainly, though “man seeks to” do something does not imply that man succeeds in so doing. It would be great to attach numerical probability, in a meaningful way, to singular events, but that doesn’t make it possible.
Your examples, I think, were meant to motivate the idea that there are meaningful numerical probabilities for singular events. I cannot agree that they have done so. I think that this claim is not necessary for your more substantial claim, with which I agree. That is, the idea that probability is epistemic need not imply that we can assign meaningful numerical probabilities to singular events. These examples, I think, better serve as cases for illustrating just this fact.
[...] trials of these subsets arriving at the established frequencies that define the probabilities. Crovelli (2009) argues that this is a mistaken approach, and that a subjective assessment of individual trials [...]
I just started reading your article and feel compelled to comment on the boxing analogy. I beleive the profit from gamblng is not made from a calculation of probability of a single event. The profit from gambling is made by the actions of the class of investors. The profit from probability correlates to the class of investors and not the singular event. The utility of a numerical probability measurement of a single event of win or loss is close to meaningless. For example, even 60/40 odds when restricted to a single event has little utility for profit making. Would you bet your life on a single event even if you accurately calculated the probability to be 90% in your favor? On the contrary you might bet your life if I gave you the opportunity to bet on the average of 1 million events? That is what casinos do, the more investors the more likely the probabilty calculation will work in their favor. Does this profit depend solely on whether one boxer wins or loses a boxing match? No, the profit is made regardless of the outcome.
Hi Robb,
I think you are misunderstanding my point with regard to the boxing analogy. The point is that bookies and casinos generate odds that are remarkably accurate for singular cases. Whether they generate these odds through a sportsbook, or by employing people capable of picking winners, or whatever, the point is that the odds are accurate. Just take a look at the odds on, say, basketball in your local paper. These are remarkably accurate numerical predictions about singular events, are they not? If so, then how can the von Mises brothers say that numerical probabilities cannot be calculated for singular events?
Great paper!!
Yet, it has to be corrected in one way.
In Human Action, Ludwig von Mises was attacking the mechanistic econometrics.
But all the austrian economists [Ludwig's followers] recognize that predictions can be made.
Predicting is an “art”, not a mechanistic-exact-econometrical ‘positivistic science’. Hoppe explains this very well.
As austrians [Ludwig's followers] recognize, entrepreneurs are good at predictions, because they have better information -as bookies.
So, it is not completely acurate to say or to suggest that Ludwig said that the type of prediction bookies make are impossible.
Maybe there is a confusion in Ludwig’s words. “Probability” and “predictions” sound similar, but austrians talk specifically about “predictions.”
There is something else to be considered:
when you say “These are remarkably accurate numerical predictions about singular events, are they not? If so, then how can the von Mises brothers say that numerical probabilities cannot be calculated for singular events?”
The bookie does not say: “there is a 50% of probability that this horse will win.”
The bookie says: “this horse will win. Based on my information, this horse is the best”
The horse will win or not.
The bookie will not always be right [the horse might break a leg.]
Then we can count the times the bookie was right and the times the bookie was wrong.
And then, based on this we can find an “average”.
In this video:
Praxeology: The Austrian Method
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hiXcO3pcR8I
Hans-Hermann Hoppe explains the type of predictions austrians can make. Bookies are ok.
wanna see how to predict which horse will win?
Derren Brown – the System Part 1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lX94fV4TWbc
It is a trick of mind.
Mark,
If you correct this, you sound exactly like L.Mises.
L.Mises said: Human Actions [social sciences] cannot be predicted mechanistically by mathematics.
And you are advancing this case by saying that we don’t [we cannot] know everything about the ways nature [the weather for example] works. There is some stuff we cannot control.
“uncertainty is ascertained to derive solely from our limited mental capacity to comprehend all of the relevant factors involved in any given process, while the process itself is governed by causally deterministic laws”
Mr. Bayona,
Thanks for the comment. I agree with you that the Austrians did not say that prediction was impossible– even in singular cases. But, virtually all Austrians, including Ludwig von Mises, have said that numerical probability cannot be applied to singular cases. As Mises wrote, “Case probability is not open to any kind of numerical evaluation.” They reached this conclusion, I argue, because of Richard von Mises’s definition of probability, which was virtually synonymous with the relative frequency method. They have claimed, in other words, that the ONLY legitimate way to generate a numerical probability is through the frequency method. Whether or not it is true that numerical probabilities cannot be applied to singular cases depends upon what the definition of probability is. I claim that this is not true, if we define probability subjectively.
I am going to be presenting a new paper at the Austrian Scholar’s Conference in a few weeks specifically addressing Ludwig von Mises’s theory of probability. I don’t want to spoil the surprise, but one of my main arguments in the paper I will present is that Ludwig von Mises did not give us a general definition of probability in Human Action at all, or anywhere else, as far as I am aware. This is all my papers aim to do: to bring the Austrian School over to the subjectivist side of the definitional debate.
I certainly do not mean to imply that Austrians dismiss prediction as absurd, because obviously they don’t. They just think predictions are something very different from “probability.” This claim depends upon what probability is defined as.
Does this clarify anything?
Cheers,
Mark Crovelli
Yes.
Thanks Mark.
Check this out.
Today on Mises.org:
The Correct Theory of Probability
by Murray N. Rothbard
http://mises.org/daily/4128
I want to add something.
if probability means “ignorance” [knowledge that we don't have yet, knowledge we cannot control yet], how can econometricians try to make predictions based on that “ignorance”?
Your paper advances the L.Misesian case against econometrics.
Thanks Mark, your paper made my day!
Mark,
Excellent paper!
Here is a brief comment from a philosophical perspective.
I believe that most Austrians (don’t know about Mises – would need extensive historical study) would generally adopt either metaphysical free will or an agnositicism about the free will question along the lines of Immanuel Kant’s showing that for all we can know the mind itself structures reality in such a way that we cannot conceive of human actions except in terms of beliefs/desires that are causally linked in “time” as it itself is structured by the mind. Likewise, the mind allows for the use of the scientific method (using objectively repeated events) to be used to make sense of the causal connections between “physical” events.
Basically, there is the option that folk psychology could be “true” in which case human action is not deterministic in any mathematical sense, but beliefs and desires are still causally linked to actions in a way that allows significant order to the world.
Therefore, the type of probability appropriate for the physical world is frequentist (because it makes fewer assumptions than Bayesian probability) and the proper methodoloy for economics (which deals with human actions) is the use of logic to provide deductive claims about what results should follow from given beliefs. The use of subjective probability will be fine so long as it is realized that it amounts to a “guess” and is not considered a “scientific” procedure. Economics as a science is different from physics and must use deductive methods based on logic to obtain lasting knowledge.
Jason,
I appreciate the comment. I would like to observe, however, that my argument does not require that the world, or the human part thereof, be deterministic in the way that hard determinists claim. All that is required for my argument to hold is that every event have a cause of some sort, including human actions. If every event or human action has a cause of some sort, then the reason why we don’t know the outcome of the event or action is our own mental limitation. Hence, the subjective definition for probability must hold for human actions as well, unless one were to make the (totally non-Austrian) claim that human actions are uncaused.
In order for the frequentist definition to ever be acceptable, the events or actions that occur in the world would have to have no cause whatsoever.
Does this clarify my position? I hold that the subjective definition for probability must be adopted for the natural AND human worlds, as long as we hold that every event or action has a cause.
Cheers,
Mark
Very interesting paper that challenges a critical foundational element of praxeology, the distinction between class and case probability. I believe, however, that Mr. Crovelli is unsuccessful.
I use probability theory regularly to determine whether clinical processes in a hospital are in or out of control. These follow the probability theory as developed by RvM and Kolmogorov. I also forecast the probability of single events, for example, whether or not a particular capital investment will have a return above my cost of capital. But as Frank Knight, LvM, Rothbard, Huerta de Soto and Hoppe have argued, these are two completely separate disciplines that use different tools and different human aptitudes, even though day-to-day language may confuse the two.
The first deals with risk, class probability, knowledge, the second deals with uncertainty, case probability, and understanding. The first is used by the accountant and the natural scientist, the second is used by the entrepreneur and the social scientist. The first is the realm of the insurance adjustor, the second is the realm of individual responsibility.
Mr. Crovelli attempts to blur the distinction between both disciplines by postulating that the law of causality requires one to do so. The proof is tenuous at best. Just because a bookie or an entrepreneur avail themselves of the law of causality, make accurate predictions, and use numbers and math to do so, this does not prove that the bookie and the entrepreneur use probability theory. They do not. They use estimates. They do not use standard deviations and normal distributions and sigma calculations and the law of large numbers and hypothesis testing, etc. They use hunches. Some of us are better than others acting on these hunches. Successful ones make a lot of money. The rest of us are their employees.
On a practical day-to-day level managing processes and businesses, I can say unequivocally that confounding both disciplines is of absolutely no use. At a theoretical level, if Mr. Crovelli is successful, this indeed would crumble the whole edifice of praxeology and would justify state interventionism, so I do think this discussion is of great importance. But it is indeed a tall order for Mr. Crovelli. As Rothbard states in p. 60 of Man Economy and State, “the efforts…to apply mathematical probability theory to uncertanty of future historical events are completely in vain.” To undo the work of Fermat, Pascal, RvM, Kolmogorov, etc., on probability theory, and the work of LvM, Frank Knight, Rothbard, Hoppe, Huerta de Soto, etc., on economic theory, Mr. Crovelli would need to advance a much more in depth proof. I certainly look forward to it.
Mr. Tenreiro,
I’m afraid that you have missed the proof I have supplied in my paper if you think I merely based my argument on bookies and casinos. Instead, my proof relies upon the fact that, in a causally deterministic world, ALL events and phenomena have prior and certain causes. As such, the fact that we don’t know what is going to happen is due SOLELY to our own ignorance of those causal factors. Hence, when we generate probabilities for ourselves, we must be generating a measure of our own uncertainty, not something “out there” in the world. The simple fact of the matter is that in a causally deterministic world, every event has a prior and certain cause, BY DEFINITION. There is nothing probabilistic about such causes in a causally deterministic world. There are only probabilities from the point of view of human beings who, due to their lack of omniscience, cannot know everything that would be required to know to say with certainty that something will or will not occur.
If you doubt this proof, as you indeed may, you need to show that either A) the world is not governed by time-invariant causal laws, or 2) provide some rationale for saying that the definition of probability does not depend upon the nature of the world, as I have argued.
I would certainly look forward to seeing such an argument, if you can provide one, howsoever impossible I may deem that to be.
In addition, I think it is a gigantic non sequitur to claim that my argument undercuts the very foundation of praxeology. I am aware of no Austrians who would claim that the whole science of praxeology hangs like a thread from the definition of probability, and that we must be forever vigilant that this thread never be cut. On the contrary, the science of praxeology is founded upon the action axiom. As such, we need not run around defending faulty definitions of probability in the mistaken fear that our science is founded upon the definition of a single, rather esoteric, word.
Cheers,
Mark
I don’t think I’m the only one who would hang the whole of praxeology on the thread of probability. LvM’s Human Action p. 105: “The uncertainty of the future is already implied in the very notion of action. That man acts and that the future is uncertain are by no means two independent matters. They are only two different modes of establishing one thing.”
If what you mean is that in a world of perfectly omniscient beings (or what is equivalent, in a world without human beings) probability theory is unnecessary, then I agree with your proof but I don’t see why this matters because it follows that in such a world while acts of humans may exist, human action does not.
Mr. Tenreiro,
I think that you are reading something into my argument that does not actually follow from it. Let me try to explain why.
My argument is really very simple. Again, it is simply that IF everything that occurs in the world has a cause, then the reason why man does not know whether an event will or will not occur is that he is ignorant, to some degree at least, about the causes of the event’s outcome. This is another way of saying that, in the real world, man is NOT omniscient. For, if he were omniscient, he would already know what is going to happen, and (as you rightly point out), he would not act, in the Austrian sense of the word.
Bearing all this in mind, I’m not sure why you think that my argument undercuts the concept of action. I am NOT arguing that man IS INDEED omniscient, and thus has no need to generate probabilities or act. Quite the reverse, because I am explicitly arguing that man IS NOT omniscient, and that is why he generates probabilities to measure his uncertainty about future events or phenomena.
So, you would be right to chastise my argument if I were in fact arguing that man is omniscient. But, this is not a valid criticism of my argument, since I am NOT arguing that man is omniscient. Simply defining probability as a measure of human uncertainty in no way implies that man is omniscient.
I hope this clarifies my argument.
Cheers,
Mark
The world of nature and physics, the subject of scientific knowledge, is governed by causality, but the world of human action, while presupposing causality, is not. Instead, human action is governed by teleology: goals, the intensity of the subjective values that we assign to those goals, means to reach those goals, how useful and scarce those means are, etc.
Human action cannot be traced back to its causes; it is an axiom, the ultimate given; this requires methodological individualism and methodological dualism (one method for the the natural world, one for human action). It is only after Austrians postulate the necessity of methodological dualism that they propose that the appropriate method for the study of the natural world is hypothetical-deductive aided by numerical probability and other mathematical tools, but that human action itself and the scientific study of human action (praxeology) cannot use numerical probability. Human action uses entrepreneurial estimates or hunches, and praxeology uses an apriori-deductive method with no mathematics or probability theory. This is why Austrians must speak of case vs class probability, uncertainty vs risk, decentralized vs centralized knowledge, etc.
Mr. Tenreiero,
I am a bit unclear about what you are arguing here. Are you trying to say that human actions DO NOT have any cause whatsoever? If you are making this claim, then this is a totally un-Austrian view, because the Austrian view is that human actions are all caused by purpose-driven reasoning and volition of the individual actors. Human actions, according to the Austrians, do not just happen for no reason whatsoever. On the contrary, they always and necessarily occur because the actor believes that he will make himself subjectively better off if he act than if he does not act. This impulse is the cause of human actions. This is the view of human action that I hold, as well.
Now, since the Austrian view is that human actions are all caused, then human action is no different from the natural world with respect to probability. For, if man were omniscient, he knew in advance all of the various factors that influence men’s actions, and he would know in advance how everyone would act. He would have no use for probability whatsoever in that case. But, since man is NOT omniscient, he has a need to measure his uncertainty about how men will act, and how the natural world will behave. This is the role probability plays for man, as long as he lacks omniscience.
Does this clarify anything?
Cheers,
Mark
No, I am not saying that human actions do not have a cause, just that causality does not govern human actions, teleology does.
Methodological individualism and methodological dualism as proposed by the Austrians (that they derive from the qualitative difference between the world of physics and nature and the world of human action and ideas) demand that we be extremely careful when studying the bridges that link the natural world to human action, especially when the bridge suggested by the paper, probability theory, is a key method used by the natural sciences.
I am not trying to discourage you from your investigations. I just know that praxeology is like one of those big gothic cathedrals, and if you move one column here and there, it can have a big effect on the whole, hence my skepticism,and perhaps that of many others here, about your proof.
I can just tell you what I read or re-read as a result of the challenge your paper posed. I think these can illuminate the waters you are navigating:
*LvM’s Human Action Chapters 1 through 6. I found that it wasn’t enough to concentrate on Chapter 6. I needed to understand how LvM set up class vs case probability and why, so the first 5 are more important to your subject than Chapter 6.
*Huerta de Soto’s Socialism, Economic Calculation and Entrepreneurship Chapter 2. He goes over some of the same material as LvM above, but he adds material from Hayek, Polanyi, Oakeshott, etc. You can find the English translation in his website under “books in english” at http://www.jesushuertadesoto.com
*Hayek’s The Counter-Revolution of Science Part 1.
*Hayek’s The Sensory Order.
Thank you for the dialogue.
Mr. Tenreiro,
I can certainly understand your concern that natural and human phenomena not be treated as identical. Scientism is a serious problem in the social sciences, to be sure. However, it is possible to become overly sensitized to the errors of scientism to the point where one starts thinking fallaciously in the opposite direction. That is, one can fall victim to the fallacious idea that human action and natural phenomena are ALWAYS completely incommensurable. This, too, is an error that we need to guard against.
This seems to be the error you are making in critiquing my argument, because you are assuming that any discussion of human action and natural phenomena is AUTOMATICALLY misguided. But there are clearly cases in which one can legitimately discuss both human action AND natural phenomena without involving the fallacy of scientism. For example, one is not committing the scientistic fallacy if one states “human actions and natural phenomena both occur on planet Earth,” just because they are both discussed in the same sentence.
There is no scientistic error committed in simply stating that everything that occurs in the world has a cause. You are right to say that the causes in the natural world are different from the causes that affect human action. But, for the purposes of my argument, that point is completely irrelevant. All that matters for my argument is that every event or phenomena that occurs in the world has a cause. And a simple statement that everything has a cause is not, in itself, a scientistic statement. And neither is it an attempt to “bridge” the natural and social worlds. It is simply a statement of fact.
I hope this helps our discussion.
Cheers,
Mark
If human actions were governed by time-invariant causes, how would you prove that the statement “human actions are governed by time-invariant causes” is true? You would have to find the causes that caused you to discover the statement “human actions are governed by time-invariant causes” after the event took place, which is absurd (or similarly, you would need an omniscient being to confirm it, also absurd). Following your proof, you can always say “there is an 80% chance that human actions are governed by time-invariant causes”, but this too is, of course, absurd.
Human actions, therefore, are not governed by time-invariant causes.
They are indeed governed by time invariant causal laws. For example: “all human action is purposeful.”
The statement “all human action is purposeful,” the Misesian action-axiom, is a true a priori synthetic proposition that cannot be derived through time-invariant causality. I believe this is where your proof may break down.
In addition to the reading list above, you may want to check out Hoppe’s “Economic Science and the Austrian Method” where he proves that actions are not causally connected events.
Mr. Tenreiro,
I suppose you didn’t notice that I cited Hoppe’s book in my paper. Look, I think this discussion is going nowhere because you are under the false impression that my argument denies the existence of human action, or that my argument implies that human action is radically different from what L. von Mises says it is. Reading these ideas into my argument are completely misguided, however.
As I have already said, my argument only requires that human actions have causes. Human actions do indeed have causes. The causes are the purposeful intentions and volition of the actors themselves. This is the end of the story as far as my argument is concerned.
For the purpose of my argument, it does not matter whether human action is purposeful or determined by thousands of Hindu gods. All that matters is that there is something or someone causing everything that occurs in the world, and that human actions and natural phenomena do not occur “randomly” and without cause, as Richard von Mises argued.
So, if we are going to continue to debate the merits of my definition for probability, and not get sidetracked into a debate about the nuances of human action, it is important for you to explain to me how it would be possible for a human action to occur without any cause whatsoever.
Cheers,
Mark
You stated above that your argument depends on this proposition: that human actions are governed by time-invariant causes.
I am asking you to prove that the above proposition is true without falling into the three performative contradictions I indicated above.
Nope, I never said that my argument depended upon human action being governed by time-invariant causal laws. That happens to be true, but my argument does not depend upon it. As I’ve said, my argument only depends upon human actions being caused by something. Whether the cause is the volition of the individual actors (as Austrians claim), or it is caused by the Hindu gods or Mother Earth is totally irrelevant. All that matters is that human actions are caused by something or someone. So, you are totally missing the point of my argument if you are going to try to get us tied up in some tangental argument about the nuances of human action.
What matters is whether human actions have causes. Do you dispute that they do indeed have causes? Are you really saying that human actions have no causes whatsoever?
Cheers,
Mark
“What matters is whether human actions have causes.”–Mark Crovelli
Answer my question: prove that human actions have causes without falling into a performative contradiction.
Human actions do not occur for no reason whatsoever. Is this not obvious to you? You are an Austrian, are you not? For Austrians, the cause of human action is the intention and volition of the actors themselves. I don’t know how many more times I can say this.
Are you really trying to argue that human actions have NO CAUSE WHATSOEVER?
You seem to be under the impression that I am arguing that human actions are caused in the same way that natural phenomena are caused. I have never said this, and, in fact, I explicitly disavow this idea both in my article and above.
So, let me state this again, in the hope you will read it this time: human actions are caused by the intentions and volition of the actors themselves. Human actions thus have causes, and they do not occur for no reason whatsoever.
Cheers,
Mark
You have not answered my question: state your proof that human actions have causes.
Here is my proof that they do not, that we have no way of knowing that human actions have causes. If human action had causes, as I wrote above, then what about the statement “human actions have causes” which is, presumably, a human action itself? How do you explain how you came up with that statement? In other words, what caused you to come up with the statement “human actions have causes”? Did you learn it from experience? From past observations? From future observations? From probability theory? From subjective probability, as in, there is an 80% chance that I’m right? A mystical experience perhaps?
The answer is none of the above because one cannot prove that human action have causes without falling into a contradiction.
All of the categories of human action (means, ends, choice, costs, profit, time, and even causality itself) are derived via the action-axiom. They cannot be observed nor predicted.
Human actions are governed by teleology. Everything else is governed by causality. Both realms of phenomena are mutually exclusive but complementary. This duality demands two separate methods of study, that is, methodological dualism, the orthodox Austrian view, one for human actions (praxeology and entrepreneurship), another one for everything else (the scientific method, probability theory, etc.). Probability theory can and is used for “everything else,” but it cannot be used to study or predict human action.
Until you can prove that human actions have causes, we have to agree, per your own admission, that we cannot use probability (RvM’s, LvM’s or yours) to predict and that therefore your proof is incorrect.
Stating “human actions do not occur for no reason whatsoever” or “I don’t know how many more times I can say this” or “isn’t this obvious to you?” or “you are an Austrian, are you not?” is not a proof that the statement “human actions have causes” is true.
So answer my question: prove that human actions have causes without falling into a performative contradiction.
If you cannot prove it yourself, can you at least offer a citation from Mises, Hayek, Hoppe, Huerta de Soto, Rothbard, Gordon, Long, or any other prominent Austrian who has written on methodology wherein they prove that human actions have causes, or better yet, wherein they prove that human actions have causes and that therefore we can use probability to study human actions?
You are so very confused here. The proof that human actions have causes is simply that human action is purposeful. Human actions occur whenever the actor believes that he will be made better off by acting than not acting. Hence, the purpose-driven intentions of human actors drives their choice to act or not act. This is Austrianism 101.
You are way, way off base if you think that there is some sort of performative contradiction involved here, because the phrase “human action is purposeful” is another way of saying that human actions have causes (i.e., a reason for occurring or not occurring), and this is the very core proposition for Austrians.
You are getting hung up on my choice of the word “cause,” which is making you think that I mean something analogous in the human world as in the natural world. This is not how I use the word, however, as you can gather from my paper, wherein I explicitly describe that I use the term in the sense of “causal determinism.” This is in contrast to the “indeterminism” of Richard von Mises. I could have just as well have used the phrase “reason for occurring” instead of the word “cause.” But, I wanted to contrast my causal determinism (and Ludwig von Mises’s determinism) with the crazy indeterminism of Richard von Mises.
Cheers,
Mark
“Causal determinism” means simply that event B is determined or caused by a prior event A (or to paraphrase your paper, that every event has an antecedent and time-invariant cause). This is exactly they way in which Mises, every Austrian, every philosopher, and you and I use the term “cause.” We at least agree on the definition of “cause.” So there is nothing confusing about your choice or my choice of the word “cause.” It is perfect.
Now, because we cannot know that human action B was caused by prior event A and because we cannot know that the statement “human action have causes” was caused by a prior event, Mises and Hoppe both argue that human actions and praxeology are not governed by causality but by teleology, that we face the insurmountable chasm of methodological dualism, and that we must distinguish between case and class probability. And this exactly why your definition of subjective probability is incorrect.
So we would still have to answer the challenge, we must prove that any one of the statements below is true, without falling into a performative contradiction:
1) “Human actions have causes”
2) “Human actions are ‘causally determined’ ”
3) “Human action B is caused by a prior event A”
4) “Human actions have antecedent and time-invariant causes”
Or, let us quote a prominent Austrian who has written on methodology proving any of them.
Until then we have to conclude that your proof of subjective probability is incorrect.
On a lighter but related note:
“ ‘Human action is purposeful’ is another way of saying that human actions have causes”–Mark Crovelli
“I could have just as well have used the phrase ‘reason for occurring’ instead of the word ‘cause’ “–Mark Crovelli
So instead of starting his Treatise on Economics with the sentence: “Human action is purposeful behavior” Mises could have just written: “Human actions have causes,” or better still: “Human actions have reasons for occurring?”
Listen, I enjoy your LRC articles and I do appreciate the time you have spent reading and responding. Maybe my comments rung a bell with you. Maybe not. But your paper and comments made me re-anchor certain concepts of human action and causality and for that I am thankful.
I am going to rephrase my argument as it refers to human action in a way that you can understand it, because you are still so obsessed with the word “cause.”
Human action, like natural phenomena, does not occur for no reason whatsoever. Human action occurs whenever a man values some end and uses some means to try to achieve that end. As is the case with natural phenomena, however, man is not omniscient, so he is thus not in a position to know how other men will act in the world. He does not know the state of other men’s wills, nor does he really know what ends other men value, or the means that other men think will achieve their ends.
IF MAN WAS OMNISCIENT, however, he would know how other men were going to act even before they acted. He would have advance knowledge of the goals each man subjectively valued, and he would have advance knowledge about the means each man intended to use in order to achieve his goals. For a man endowed with such omniscience, there would be nothing uncertain or probabilistic at all about human action. He would know in advance, AND FOR CERTAIN, how other men are going to act.
Man is obviously not omniscient, however, when it comes to either human action OR natural phenomena. He does not know all of the factors that cause a natural event to occur. He does not know the state of other men’s minds. He thus often has a need to measure how likely these events and actions are, given his ignorance of their causes. This is where probability comes into the picture for man. He uses probability to measure his uncertainty about the world.
Man does not use probability to measure something “out there” in the world, however. For, if man knew all of the various causal factors that influence natural phenomena, and all of the various subjective ideas that motivate human action, he would have no need for probability at all. He would know, in advance and for certain, what will occur. When he uses probability, man thus measures his own ignorance about the world.
The only way around this conclusion would be to argue, as did Richard von Mises, that certain things can occur in the world FOR NO REASON WHATSOEVER. He was an indeterminist, in other words, which opened the door to countering my argument. Austrians, on the other hand, are not free to argue that things occur in the world for no reason whatsoever, so this avenue of attack is barred from them.
I hope this clarifies my argument, so we can get back to discussing it, rather than debating something completely extraneous.
Cheers,
Mark
P.S. L. von Mises was a hard determinist, so the phrases I cited are essentially equivalent for him.
Dear Mr. Crovelli,
I take issue with your postscript: “L. von Mises was a hard determinist, so the phrases I cited are essentially equivalent for him.”
The phrases in question are:
(1) “Human action is purposeful behavior,”
(2) “Human actions have causes,” and
(3) “Human actions have a reason for occurring.”
I don’t think these are essentially equivalent. Consider the following propositions:
(1) “A pit bull is a dog,”
(2) “A pit bull is an animal,” and
(3) “A pit bull is a living organism”
Suppose I’m a “hard anima-caninist” and believe that all dogs are animals. While this would mean that (2) and (3) follow necessarily from (1), it in no way implies that (1) is “essentially equivalent” to (2) and (3).
In fact, by insisting that there is no essential difference between saying (1) versus (2) and (3), I eliminate the possibility of forming any scientific statements that may be unique to the relationship expressed in (1).
The implications of this become clear if we try to do a little pit-bull science on the basis of our foundational claim. Let’s say I have recently purchased a pit bull. What should I give it to eat? Well, it’s an animal, right? What do animals eat? Compare that method versus saying, well, it’s a dog, right? What do dogs eat? The latter line of questioning will clearly yield more precise and interesting results. The former might very well kill my pit bull.
One might object that all pit bulls are dogs but not all dogs are pit bulls, and therefore inquiring what dogs-in-general eat isn’t going to solve my pit-bull-diet problem. But remember that for Mises, human beings are the only things that act purposefully. So to make the analogy a better fit, we’d have to suppose that pit bulls were the only dogs we knew of.
That Mises, even as a hard determinist, couldn’t have thought the propositions were “essentially equivalent” is also clear from the second sentence of human action. He describes human action in a number of additional ways beyond “purposeful behavior,” including his contrasting it with “animal reaction.” Now, for a hard determinist, animal actions are caused no less than human actions are caused (and still less so the movement of rocks). Yet Mises seems to think that human actions are different in kind than the movement of rocks or animal reaction. And insofar as it’s distinguishable, the science of economics has a role in explaining the implications of this.
Mr. Coleman,
I think you are reading far too much into what I wrote. I certainly didn’t say that Mises thought that human action and natural phenomena were identical in every way. What I said is true even for soft determinists and causal determinists. Human actions do not occur for no reason whatsoever. They occur whenever the actor believes that he can make himself better off by acting than by refraining from acting. So, when one says “human action is purposeful,” he is also thereby saying that there is a reason for the action to take place, and a cause(s) for the action. The causes of action lie within man, (i.e., his volition and subjective beliefs), but they are causes nonetheless.
I’m not trying to say that human actions are identical to natural phenomena. All I am saying is that human actions do not occur for no reason whatsoever. They don’t just randomly occur, in the way that Richard von Mises thought atomic particles randomly and schizophrenically move around for no reason. There is a reason why every single human action occurs, and there is also a cause for every single human action.
That’s all I was pointing out.
Cheers,
Mark
I would like to recommend in this context the book
Probability theory: The logic of science
by E. T. Jaynes.
It is available at
at http://omega.albany.edu:8008/JaynesBook.html
While it is a book for specialists, I think the first sections give an interesting introduction into subjective probability theory accessible for the non-specialist too.
The very point relevant to the discussion here is that justifies numerical probabilities as the appropriate apparatus for plausible reasoning, which has nothing to do with frequencies.
And it also clarifies some more philosophical/political issues: the frequentist interpretation has a strong empiricist background, so that subjectivist probability is also anti-empiricist, and, in fact, as the mathematics of plausible reasoning it can be considered as a natural part of praxeology.